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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
When the developing countries carry out their development programmes,
they are bound to come across a series of problems such as the choice
between import-substitution and export-orientation, the production of
primary goods and manufactures, diversification and specialization etc.
But from the very beginning, they have to decide whether an inward-looking
policy stressing on import-substitution is preferable to an outward-
looking policy with emphasis on export expansion, or vice versa.
H. Myint had taken the concrete example of the postwar economic
development of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Burma.
He showed that Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia experienced a rapid
postwar development (both Thailand and the Philippines doubled their pre-
war real gross national product) while the gross national product of Burma
and Indonesia rose by a bare l196.1 While the former three had bent on
an outward-looking attitude towards foreign trade and with a greater
reliance on market forces, the latter two leaned on an inward-looking
and even hostile attitude towards foreign trade and investment along with
large-scale state intervention in economic life.2
Many of the developing countries adopt an inward-looking strategy
on the inception of their development by building up labour-intensive
I H. Myint, Economic Theory and Development Policy, Economica,
Vol. 34 (May 1967), pp. 117-131.
z Although it might be the market mechanism that gave rise to the
difference in economic achievement of these countries, the impact of inward
and outward looking policies on the development of the respective countries
should be no means be overlooked.
2
industries such as textiles, garment and footwear etc. through protection
in order to meet their domestic demand.3 When the domestic market is
saturated they have to seek other outlets for their industrial products.
Hence, some move into new and more advanced industries while others seek
outlets abroad. A number of them chose the latter alternative and
witnessed remarkable success, notably Taiwan and South Korea.
However, it is not the purpose of this study to expound whether
import-substitution is preferable to export-orientation, or vice versa.
But based on the success experienced by the above-mentioned. countries,
it does provide some traceable hints. The simple fact is, if international
trade could make a tremendous contribution to them, the same could be true
for the new comers. Furthermore, the contribution of international trade
to economic development can be greater than what it appears to be if the
dynamic benefits" that it bestows are not underrated.4
In fact, witnessed by the past experience of most developed countries
which had undergone rapid income growth parallel with rapid trade growth,
the relationship between economic development and international trade
becomes an important issue to many theoreticians and policy-makers. Yet
3 There is a necessary time interval between the point at which
decision is made to set up the infant industry and the point at which the
industry is strong enough to stand against well-established outside com-
petition. However, if the industry is soundly based, the need for pro-
tection will decline as the learning process is completed and the needed
services are supplied. In the case of those LDCs which are fortunate
enough to have been endowed with specific resources, protection may not
be necessary.
4 According to G. Harberler, the dynamic benefits of trade include
the provision of material means indispensable for economic development,
transmission of technical and managerial know-how and entrepreneurship,
transfer of capital especially from the developed to less developed coun-
tries, and guarantee for the maintenance of free competition. See Gerald
M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development Studies in International
Poverty (Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 494-495.
3the concomitant achievements in income and trade growth attained by the
developed countries during their early stages of development might be
caused by other factors and there is not necessarily a unique relation
between export and income growth.5 But the belief that trade is a
necessary catalyst of development has been increasingly accepted by the
policy-makers of the developing countries.6
1.2 WORLD TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SINCE WORLD WAR II
The period since World War II witnessed the fastest sustained growth
in world exports especially of manufactures over the last hundred years.
It was due mainly to the liberalization of trade in manufactures from
severe restrictions during the 1930s and the war, and the rapid economic
expansion of the developed countries during the postwar period. The trend
towards trade liberalization and the integration of western economies
during the postwar era also exhilarate exports of the developing countries
considering their low base in terms of value to start with.
Actually we do not know exactly whether the appearance of customs
unions since the war contributes to trade-diversion or trade-creation.
5 During the period of mid-1950 to mid-60 the percentage growth of
Atlantic Community exports was nearly twice as great as its income growth
under-developed countries' exports rose a little slower than income. Yet
income in the two areas grew at nearly the same rate. John Pincus, Trade,
Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (New York, 1967), PP.58
69.
6 Development need not depend so much on expansion of exports if a
country has a sufficiently large domestic market. But it is generally
agreed that the smaller the national population (hence the smaller the
domestic market) the greater must be its dependence on trade. Thus it
is conceived that the developing world with a preponderance of small
countries should place greater emphasis on the expansion of export trade.
Ibid., pp. 68-71.
4Nor can we determine precisely how trade-diversion and trade-creation
have affected the world as a whole. However, the existence of trade
integration, in many cases,, can more or less provide impetus to the
economic growth of participating countries (at least the EEC) and create
demand for imports which, in turn, may provide export opportunities for
the developing countries.?
As the rapid growth of world trade is largely accounted for by the
expansion of trade in manufactures among the developed countries, the
developing countries, being circumscribed by the nature of their economies,
have limited participation in total world trade. In the mid-1960s, total
export of the developing countries accounted for 20% of the world trade
with more than two third of which going to the non-communist developed
countries. Over half of the world's export was in manufactures and the
respective percentage for the developing countries was only 16%. Hence
the developing countries' share in world export of manufactures was at the
proximity of 596.8 Even this small portion of export in manufactures was.
unevenly distributed owing to the disparity in their levels of economic
development. Rahman showed that in 1968 about 78% of the developing coun-
tries' total export of manufactures came from six countries, viz., Hong
Kong, India, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico and Pakistan (with Hong Kong alone
7 J. Williams and A. Bottrill showed that intra-EEC trade in 1969 was
about 509% greater than it would have been if the EEC had not been created.
Most of this rise appears to be attributable to trade-creation while.the
harm done to other countries' exports by diversion was more than offset by
positive external trade-creation. The corresponding figure for the EFTA
was 25% in 1965. John Williams and Anthony Bottrill, "The Impact of Cus-
toms Unions on Trade in Manufactures in The Economics of Integration,
M. B. Krauss ed. (Oxford, 1973), pp. 118-151.
6 All percentages are calculated from data given in M. Z. Cutajar and
A. Franks, The Less Developed Countries in World Trade (London, 1967),
Table 3, p. 2.
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accounting for 33%). The aggregate share of the Philippines, Iran,
Israel, Argentina and Brazil amounted to 12% of the total export, and
the other 26 countries accounted for the rest 8%.9
Notwithstanding the fact that protectionism, which reached its peak
during the Depression, was replaced by a trend toward liberalization by
reciprocal tariff cutting extending from 1934 to 1972, the developing
countries. still attribute their laggard growth of export trade to pro-
tective measures instituted by the developed countries. In most cases,
tariffs have been persistently biased against their exports particularly
in items of interest to them. The developing countries claim that if it
is the intention of the industrial countries to give substance to the
slogan Trade, not aid, the latter should eliminate or, at least, reduce
the restrictions imposed on their exports*10
1.3 TRADE LIBERALIZATION SINCE WORLD WAR II
1.3.1 The GATT and the Developing Countries
In response to the growing and changing needs for trade, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which began to operate since
January 1948, was the first to attack the barriers to trade on a general
9 Although the developing countries chosen by Rahman for his study
only accounted for 88% of export of manufactures from all developing coun-
tries they still could serve as a good approximation for all. A.H.M.
Mahfuzur Rahman, Exports of Manufactures (Netherland, 1973), p. 83.
lu From the economic point of view, aid, as a transfer of capital, may
or may not be more productive abroad than at home. As a political issue,
the LDCs usually consider that aid has strings attached and is very often
thought to be aligned with colonial powers. Apart from these, Johnson
claimed that the actual value of aid in form of loans is always smaller
than its nominal counterpart. Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward
Less Developed Countries (New York, 1967), p. 25.
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multilateral basis. From an original membership of 23, the GATT has
grown to include in its roster of Contracting Parties a total of 87, of
which the world's major trading nations are a minority. It serves as a
forum for negotiations on the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers
and provides a set of trade rules governing the conduct of trade policy.
According to the provisions of GATT, the signatories should conduct their
trade with each other on the basis of most-favoured-nation clause and
reciprocity.11 Under the GATT rules, tariffs are to be used as the prin-
cipal instrument of protection, and quantitative restrictions and other
nontariff barriers to trade are prohibited.
Beginning with the creation of GATT the signatories held a series of
negotiations. Among them the Kennedy Round, which started in May 1964 and
concluded in June 1967, was regarded by far the most successful tariff
negotiating conference ever held. 12 It was the most wide-ranging ever and
resulted in a substantial across-the-board tariff reduction on a nondis-
13
criminatory and nonreciprocal (for LDCs) basis.13 Tariff concessions made
11 The most-favoured-nation clause requires that "the party assuming
the obligation shall not treat the other party, with respect to the subject
matter specified, worse than it treats the third country receiving the most
favorable treatment. H.C. Hawkins, Commercial Treaties and Agreements:
Principle and Practice (New York, 1951, p. 61.
However, the most-favoured-nation principle under GATT allows exceptions
for the preference systems within the British Empire and the French Union,
and customs unions and free trade areas can be retained under certain con-
ditions. M.Z. Cutajar and A. Franks, op. cit., p. 133.
1z The other five rounds held under the auspices of GATT prior to the
Kennedy Round took place in 1947 (Geneva), 1949 (Annecy), 1951 (Torquay),
1956 (Geneva), 1960/1 (Geneva). On the other hand, the Tokyo Round after
the Kennedy Round will be concluded by 1980.
13 The average tariff cut by the industrial countries has been esti-
mated at 35% of which higher percentage cuts were made for the most part on
the lower rates of duty. Cuts were below average in the sectors of tro-
pical products, other agricultural products, iron and steel, and textiles
and garment. M.Z. Cutajar and A. Franks, op. Lit., pp. 150-151.
7by the 38 participating countries (including 12 developing countries)
affected about US$40 billion of goods currently traded. Indeed, there
was little concrete action taken to improve export prospects of the
developing countries until the realization of the Kennedy Round. More
important was that the Kennedy Round established the principle of non-
reciprocity for the developing countries proving the developed countries'
increasing awareness of the trade needs of their less developed trade
partners.
At the 1960-1 Dillon Round (the one before the Kennedy Round), which
was negotiated on a bilateral product by product basis, tariff cuts affected
11% of the United States imports of materials from the developed countries
but only 2/ of materials imported from the developing countries. For
manufactures, comparable figures were 28/ and 21/.14 The results of the
United States concessions at the Dillon Round showed that these had little
effect on the developing countries' basket of exports. Benefits accrued
to them were principally spillover from the tariff concessions bestowed
among the developed countries themselves.
However, benefits accrued to the developing world by concessions made
in the Kennedy Round were much more direct and beneficial. Developing
countries' exports to EEC, the United States and to Japan of both the
developed and developing country baskets responded significantly and as
strongly as developed country exports in those products on which tariffs
l5
were reduced.
14 J.M. Finger, GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of Developing
Countries: United States Concessions at the Dillon Round, Economic Journal,
Vol. 84 (September 1974), pp. 566-574.
15 J.M. Finger, Effects of the Kennedy Round Tariff Concessions on
the Exports of Developing Countries, Economic Journal, Vol. 86 (March
1976), pp, 87-950
8
However, the Kennedy Round cuts, like those of previous rounds,
seldom touched at raw materials which accounted for more than 80% of the
developing countries' exports. In regarding manufactures, concessions
made for finished manufactures were larger than those for semi-processed
goods. 16
Bela Balassa had estimated the average rate of tariffs of the
developed countries on nonpreferential imports prior to and after the
Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. These estimates are given in
Table 1.1 showing that both the average nominal and effective rate of
tariffs on imports of manufactures from the developing countries are
relatively higher than those from all sources. Thus the main impact of
the Kennedy Round is likely to be on trade between the developed countries
Table 1.1
Averages of Nominal and Effective Tariffs on Industrial
Countries' Imports of Manufactures Before and
After the Kennedy Round
Nominal Effective
Total Imports Total Imports
imports from LDCs imports from LDCs
Pre-Kennedy 10.9 17.1 19.2 33.4
Post-Kennedy 6.5 11.8 11.1 22.6
Source: Bela Balassa, The Structure of Protection in the Industrial
Countries and its Effects on the Exports of Processed Goods
from Developing Countries, I.B.R.D., Economics Department,
Report No. EC-152a, 28 February 1968, mimeo., Table 6.
Quoted from I. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott, Industry and Trade
in Some Developing Countries (London, 1970), Table 8.1, p. 273.
Ie Tariff cuts granted to manufactured goods of interest to the
developing countries amounted to about 45% of their initial level while
those offered for other manufactured products were only 33%. Ibid.
9
because of their dominance in the negotiations, and the benefits derived
from tariff cuts accruing to the developing countries are comparatively
less important.
In addition, the Kennedy Round still leaves unresolved many trade
problems of the developing countries. Agricultural products which account
for the bulk of the developing countries' exports are generally subject
to other forms of protection erected by the developed countries. Little
progress was made during the Kennedy Round of negotiations for further
access of these products to the markets of the developed countries. Fur-
thermore, at the Kennedy Round, quantitative restrictions contradictory
to the principle of GATT were legitimized under the 'escape clause' for
reason of market disruption .17
As trade negotiations under GATT are principally through a reciprocal
bargaining process, the developing countries have no real bargaining power
for the reason that they have practically little to offer simply because
their domestic markets are too poor to attract concessions whether by
offers or by threats of retaliation. Even they are allowed to bargain
on a nonreciprocal basis, their bargaining power does not improve in the
real sense as any access they can obtain depends on the willingness of
the developed countries to make unreciprocated concessions.
1.3.2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Owing to the afore-said shortcomings the existing policies and
17 In fact, quantitative restrictions on the imports of certain manu
factures from developing countries had been widely used by the developed
countries since the initiation in 1962 of the Long Term Arrangement on
Cotton Textiles, which was intended to take effect for a period of five
years but later had been extended repeatedly.
10
institutional arrangements are subject to severe criticism by the de-
veloping countries. In an attempt to draw the awareness of the developed
countries to the prevailing trade problems they encountered, the de-
veloping countries chose UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) to serve as the forum to express their ideas and demand.
UNCTAD had its inception in Geneva 1964 bringing together 120 national
delegations, carrying the specific objective of promoting the development
of developing countries through trade. 'The central purpose of UNCTAD,
as defined by the developing countries and articulated by its Secretary
General, Raul Prebisch, was to consider ways of bridging the gap between
what the developing countries will need in foreign. exchange to finance
their import requirements for developing and what they are likely to earn
in foreign exchange from exports of goods and services'.18
The 77 developing countries which constituted the majority of UNCTAD
played a central part and formed a voting bloc in its deliberation. They
asked for the elimination of all forms of protection imposed by the
developed countries on farm products and raw materials, and the granting
of tariff preference for their exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures.
In his report, entitled 'Towards a New Trade Policy for Development',
Raul Prebisch had estimated that by 1970, in addition to those met by their
export earnings, the developing countries needed US$20 billion more in
order to assure imports sufficient to support the 5% average annual income
growth target laid down by the United Nations for the Decade of Development.19
18 R.N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York, 1964), p. 161.
19 However, Balassa reached alternative estimates that the trade gap
would be $9.4 billion in 1970 instead of Prebisch's estimate of $20 billion,
and the corresponding figure for 1975 would be $11.3 billion. Bela A.
Balassa, Trade Prospects for Developing Countries, Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
(Yale University, 19 pp. 104-105.
11
And he asserted that this $20 billion gap could be narrowed by the in-
creasing of export flows from the less to more developed countries.
Prebisch stressed that the underlying GATT principle of nondiscrimina-
tion and reciprocity towards free trade was not appropriate to the
existing trade relations between countries at vastly different levels of
economic development. He argued that the system of reciprocal bargaining
mainly reduced trade barriers to the exports of interest to the developed
countries while most of the developing countries, which tended to run
persistently deficits and their products were too fragile to stand against
competition, needed a greater protection than the developed countries.
Thus the 'Prebisch Report' suggested that as far as manufactures were
concerned the industrial countries should grant tariff preferences to
their imports of manufactured goods from the developing world.
According to this view, preferences granted by all (or most) developed
to less developed countries should cover all of the latter's manufactured
products on the basis of duty-free entry. Preferences received by indivi-
dual industries in each developing countries should last for ten years
from the time when the first plant in an industry starts to export. And
in order to give greatest benefit to the poorer countries, preferences
applied to products in which the developing countries are already com-
petitive should be withheld and granted to the less advanced ones. 20
To sum up, realizing that the trade policy underlying GATT's principle
of nondiscrimination is strictly unappropriate to the economic disparity
between the less and more advanced countries, the former want to receive
preferential treatment from the latter and oppose reductions in tariffs
efu For a brief account of preferences scheme, see M.Z. Cutajar and A.
Franks, op. cit., pp. 162-163 for the criticism, see J. Pincus, op. cit.,
DT). 197-217.
12
among industrial countries on goods covered by preferential arrangements.
In other words, if the demand of developing countries regarding tariff
preferences were granted, both developed and developing countries will
tend to move towards a two-tier tariff system, one for industrial countries
and one for developing countries.
After long-drawn discussions, industrial countries eventually brought
into effect their various schemes of Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP). Since the early 1970s almost all developed countries have been
implementing their various GSP schemes.21 The American GSP, being the
latest among others, took effect in 1976 granting duty-free entry for 2,700
items imported from 137 developing countries including many in Asia. In
fact, most of the GSP schemes provide unlimited duty-free (or large tariff
cuts) entry for certain agricultural products and most semi manufactured
and manufactured goods from beneficiary countries with exceptions for some
sensitive items' which, in most cases, include textiles and clothing.
However, the latest statistics give credence to claims that the GSP
concessions have not been up to expectation in expanding the developing
countries' exports of manufactured goods. The report written for UNCTAD
by Robert Baldwin and Tracy Murray in 1976 pointed out that the aggregate
annual effect of the GSP in terms of trade expansion is only US$480 million.
The statistics from UNCTAD (see Table 1.2) showed that only US$3,440
million worth of exports would have benefited from preference in 1973,
against a total export of dutiable goods worth US$21,600 million and'a total
21 Japan introduced phase one of her GSP scheme for the developing
countries on August 1, 1971. Phase two was due to start on April 1, 1972
at which time Hong Kong was included as a beneficiary with the exclusion
of 96 items. 1971/72 Annual Report of the Hong Kong Department of Commerce
and Industry (Hong Kong, 1972), p. 22.
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Table 1.2
Developing Countries' Exports to .Industrialized Markets in 1973
(US$ million)
All Dutiable Covered As/ of As%of
by GSP dutiablegoods goods all goods
US 13,400 9, 200 2,200 1724
EEC 4, 4oo15,900 413570
Japan 10,300 6,000 6360 3
Others 4,000 2, 000 815310
TOTAL 43,600 81621,600 3,44o
N.B. All figures rounded: Japan data for 1972; "others" estimated.
Source: UNCTAD.
Quoted from the report by Dick Wilson, "Asia: Preferences Prove a Hollow
Gesture", Far Eastern Economic Review, (February 6, 1976), Table II, p. 44.
export of all goods worth US$43,600 million.22
Nor did Asian countries (which account for the majority of manu-
factured exports from the developing world) benefit much from the GSP.
A mere 8% of the exports of developing Asian countries to the developed
countries' markets are taking advantage of the various GSP schemes offered
by the developed countries in recent years.
As a result of pressure from UNCTAD, especially from the 'Group of
77', the GSP schemes have been gradually improving. As in the case of
Japan, her scheme which on its inception affected only 3% of imports from
the developing world has been improved by about 50% in 1976. On the other
22 All these calculations assumed the operation of the American
scheme, which in fact did not start until December 1976.
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hand, the EEC has also been constantly altering its GSP scheme.23 Product
coverage of agricultural commodities subject to preferential entry under
the EEC GSP was extended to some 240 items in 1976.24 For semi-manufactured
and manufactured products within the scheme, quotas and ceilings were
increased for about 15% in the same year. But relevant figure for textile
quotas was only 5%.25 And in order to ensure a more balanced distribution
of the advantages granted to all beneficiaries, the EEC tends to offer
greater benefit to the poorer countries by limiting the share of more
competitive developing countries in its GSP imports.26
As far as the EEC's GSP is concerned, the improvements made are
fairly encouraging especially to the developing Asian countries though
it is hoped that the EEC could have done more. Meanwhile, the Japanese
scheme of GSP has been altered in favour of the developing world since
1972.
23 As Britain became full member of EEC on January 1, 1973 she was
required to conform to EEC practice as regards the scheme from January 1,
1974.
24 Meanwhile, the tariff quota for certain agricultural products such
as unmanufactured flue-cured Virginia Tobacco, tinned pineapple has been
raised and the tariff itself has been cut.
25 The EEC GSP scheme maintains a complicated system of quotas,
ceilings and butoirs, which represent the maximum amount of any product
a country is entitled to for a given quota or ceiling.
26 EEC intends to classify the beneficiary countries according to
their per capita income and their share in the Community's GSP imports.
One suggestion is to allocate no more than 10%- 20% of all quotas and
ceilings to the more competitive countries and the balance will be appro-
priated to the other exporting countries possibly without any butoir
restrictions. If so, the result will be a sharp drop in Common Market
imports under its GSP as about 50% of EEC imports under GSP are supplied
by five countries. Report by Malcolm Subhan, 'Fortress Europe' Spurns
Asia's Export Pleas, Far Eastern Economic Review, (December 12, 1975),
pp. 36-37. This re-classification has become effective in 1977.
15
Overall, efforts undertaken by the developed countries to improve
their trade concessions have doubtlessly enhanced export opportunities
of their less developed trade partners. Though improvements have been
at a slow start, the low level of imports of the developed countries from
the developing world does allow a considerable scope for the latter to
expand exports. Thus, the developing countries have shown some success
in export expansion in the 1960s. During the period 1962- 1967 and
1968, the developing countries' exports of manufactures grew at an annual
rate of 15% and 18.1%, and in the market of developed countries at 16.4%
and 26.1%, while relevant figures for total world export of manufactures
were 10.4% and 14.6%. The developing countries' share in total world
export of manufactures had increased from 4.3% in 1962 to 5.4% in 1968,
and in the market of developed countries from 3.8% to 4.9%.27
The export of manufactures from the developing countries, however,
were distributed unevenly among them with the top five, viz., Hong Kong,
Spain, Yugoslavia, India and Taiwan accounted for about 50% of the total
in 1968. Hong Kong, being the leader of the five, occupied 15%. Both
Taiwan and South Korea experienced fast growth in exports of manufactures
in the 1960s (over 50% annually), while Hong Kong's annual rate of
increase amounted to 15% during the same period and her export in 1969
was larger than those of Taiwan and South Korea combined. 28
Thus, it can be said that the 1960s was a period generally favourable
27 These figures are from H.B. Chenery and H. Hughes, Industriali-
zation and Trade Trends: Some Issues for the 1970s in Prospects for
Partnershi: Industrialization and Trade Policies in the 1970s, H. Hughes
ed. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, Table 1-, p. 29.
28 The percentages are derived from Chenery and Hughes, op. cit.,
Tables 1-2, pp. 26-27.
16
to those developing countries which were able to grasp trade opportunities.
It is unfortunate that the 1970s was marred by disruptive developments,
despite of further trade liberalization.
1.4 HONG KONG AS A CASE STUDY
Needless to say, the export performance of individual developing
countries reflected by the skewed distribution of their exports of manu-
factures may provide some insight to the nature of their economies and
their development policies. In this study, we try to trace the underlying
factor and strategy that contribute to Hong Kong's development of export
trade. The next Chapter attempts to give an overall picture of the nature
of Hong Kong's economy and her export performance in manufactures since
World War II. Chapter Three Four deal with the trade barriers in the
form of tariffs and quantitative restrictions that Hong Kong has encountered
over the years. Based upon analysis of the impact of these barriers on
her exports, we can, to a certain extent, envisage the ability of Hong Kong
in adjusting herself to the trade barriers she confronts. However, even
though Hong Kong performs well in trade despite of barriers and her pro-
ducts can meet market requirements, she must make her products known to
overseas buyers if export growth is to be sustained. Chapter Five intends
to outline the trade promotion strategy which Hong Kong employs in pushing
and publicizing her products. The last Chapter summarizes some of the
findings and investigates Hong Kong's trade prospects on the basis of past
experience.
For the purpose of this study, 'manufactures' are defined to cover
commodity sections SITC 6-8. Section 5 has been excluded due to its in-
significance in the Hong Kong export basket. Since the majority of Hong
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Kong's exports of manufactures are destined.for the developed countries,
our study will concentrate on developments in these markets, which include
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Nordic Countries, EEC,
Switzerland, Austria, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
The Eastern European countries will be mentioned in passing due to their
increasing importance to Hong Kong exports in recent years. The time
period under study will start mainly from 1960 because export statistics
were not classified separately as re-exports and domestic exports prior
to 1959. In certain cases, we have to start with 1964 owing to shortage
of trade statistics in 3-digit standard classification.
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Chapter 2 TRADE OF HONG KONG
Recognizing the not-too-bright future for trade in primary commodi-
ties and the rapid growth of world trade in manufactured goods, it is not
difficult to understand the eagerness of developing countries in looking
forward to industrialization as the high road to development.) Actually,
the attempt to increase exports of primary commodities from the developing
countries would be frustrated by protective measures of the developed
countries unlike manufactures, little progress has been made towards
trade liberalization in these goods since the war. Although exports of
manufactures originated in the developing world may also meet with res-
trictions imposed by advanced countries if they become larger, there is
considerable potential for these products to obtain further access to
markets of the latter considering their small share in world trade.
Hence deliberate economic policies, which very often involve direct
government intervention, have been adopted by the developing countries
to encourage industrialization. Policies employed during early stages of
development were concentrated on import-substitution by imposing restric-
tive measures on imports of manufactured goods. Until the end of the
1950s, very little encouragement was provided for exports. Development
through export expansion, in most case, came in only at a later stage.
1 Prebisch claimed. that, as the income elasticity of demand for pri-
mary commodities is relatively low, there is not much room for further
expansion of these goods. Furthermore, there has been a long-run downward
trend of the terms of trade of these commodities since the start of this
century, which may be aggravated if efforts are concentrated on technical
improvements in primary production without a vigorous development of
industries and their technology. Raul Prebisch, International Trade and
Payments in an Era of Coexistence Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped
Countries, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 1958, Vol.
49 (May 1959T, pp. 251-273.
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However, this has not been the case for Hong Kong on her path of
industrialization as the growth of Hong Kong's industry has taken place
strictly within the framework of free enterprise and free trade. In
fact, Hong Kong closely resembles the textbook model of nineteenth century
laissez faire economy.2
Although manufacturing in Hong Kong has a fairly long history, dating
back to the turn of the century, it was nothing more than an extension of
China's economy. Hong Kong had, for more than a hundred years, derived
her living from entrepot trade with China.3 The structure of the economy
during this time was principally commercial. The few manufacturing indus-
tries such as rope manufacturing, shipbuilding and ship repairing, food
processing and the refining of Chinese tin prior to re-export were ancillary
to the entrepot trade.4 The growth of re-export trade had led to the
developments in shipping, banking, insurance and warehouse services. Thus
Hong Kong's trade was very much related with China and was closely bound
to the events occured there.5
2 Hong Kong is a free port except that specialized licences are re-
quired for a few imports such as liquor, tobacco, table water, narcotics,
explosives and chemicals etc.
3 During the 1930s less than 10% of Hong Kong's exports were domesti-
cally manufactured, and nearly 70% of her trade was Chinese external trade
passing through Hong Kong. About one third of Hong Kong's retained imports
came from China. See G.B. Endacott, An Eastern Entrepot, Her Majesty's
.Stationery Office, (London, 1964), p.
4 G.C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far
Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
(London, 1954), pp. 168-169.
5 During the Japanese occupation of Shanghai in late 1937 and 1938,
China's imports from Hong Kong had increased from 3 to 45%, while exports
to Hong Kong increased from 12 to 41.390. After the fall of Canton into
Japanese hands, trade with China was virtually stopped. G.B. Endacott,
OP. cit., p. 187.
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Besides, during that period the Hong Kong population was highly
mobile. Annual population movements in the 1930s fluctuated between 25%
and 56% of Hong Kong's total population. People moved between Hong Kong
and the Mainland to seek employment opportunities. Hence it was quite
difficult to distinguish Hong Kong's economy from China's.
During the early postwar period Hong Kong had experienced two external
events which altered her economic course. The first was the Chinese Civil
War in 1946-1949 which resulted in large influx of refugees mainly from
the adjacent province of Kwangtung and from Shanghai causing rapid growth
of the population on the barren island.6 The other was the Korean War
which gave rise to an embargo imposed by the United Nations on shipments
of strategic commodities to Mainland China.7 This resulted in a drastic
fall in Hong Kong's total exports of nearly 50% during the period 1951-1954
chiefly accounted for by the lost of the Chinese market from which Hong
Kong had derived her living for decades.8
6 Since the end of the war, owing to the returning of former residents
and inpouring of newcomers, the population had grown rapidly from about
600,000 in August 1945 to the region of 1.8 million by the end of 1947.
In addition, subsequent waves of immigration occured in 1951-2, 1957-8 and
1962 caused the population to arrive at 3.7 million by 1966. See The
Hong Kong Economy: Achievements and Prospects by E.H. Phelps Brown in
Hong Kon: The Industrial Colon, edited by Keith Hopkins, (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1971), pp. 1-20.
? About 400 items were included in the embargo list. The value of
these commodities going to Mainland China declined from HK$676 million in
the first half of 1951 to HK33.7 million in 1955. Edward Szczepanik,
The Economic Growth of Hong Kong, (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 50.
However the United Nations embargo was only the last of a series of trade
restriction for the United States had already embargoed all her trade with
Mainland China in June 1950 and at first included Hong Kong in the ban.
Gene Gleason, Hong Kong, (London, 1964), p. 89.
8 Hong Kong's exports to Mainland China fell from HK$1.6 billion in
1951 to HK$520 million in 1952. Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger,
Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singa-
pore, (National Planning Association, 1973), p. 68.
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The embargo undertaken by the Western countries had pushed Hong Kong
to the edge of economic disaster. Shipping, finance, insurance as well
as other ancillary services went down with trade. With the loss of China
trade, Hong Kong lost half of her export market and one quarter of imports.
This was the trade which had been the main source of Hong Kong's income.
The adverse situation was aggravated by the population pressure. At that
time, it looked as if Hong Kong was finished as a world trade centre.,
However, Hong Kong was able to turn the unfavourable situation to her
advantage. The decline in entrepot trade forced Hong Kong to look for.
other means of survival instead of finding subsistence by rendering trading
services to other countries.9 Hong Kong started to place efforts on some
manufacturing operations in order to replace the losses in entrepot trade
on the one hand and provide jobs for the unemployed on the other. A
decade later she had successfully transformed herself from an entrepot to
an export-oriented industrial city. At the beginning of the 1960s, locally-
produced goods had already occupied more than 70% of the total exports.
Industrialization in Hong Kong gathered full momentum during the 1960s.
Now Hong Kong has developed into a famous manufacturing centre producing
goods chiefly for exports. Products manufactured concentrate on a few
items such as clothing, textiles, electronics, plastic manufactures and
toys etc.
2.1 POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT
Hong Kong's economy was at a standstill when the war ended in 1945.
9 Hong Kong's trade with Mainland China never regained its old place
after the 1951 debacle for even though the embargo was gradually relaxed,
Mainland China had, for both political and economic reasons, diverted her
trade from the West toward Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe before the
restrictions had came into full effect.
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Houses were destroyed or run down, managerial personnel and skilled labour
died or scattered, and much worse was the disruption of the framework of
external economic relations constituting Hong Kong's entrepot trade. But
with the rapid reestablishment of currency and credit and the returning
of residents, Hong Kong saw some light of rebuilding her economy. Besides
because of the lost in importance of Shanghai as a manufacturing and
trading centre due to the increased military conflict between the Govern-
ment and the communists in North and Central China, Hong Kong had taken
the opportunity of replacing Shanghai to restart trade between China and
the rest of the world. Later, as the communist took power in the Main-
land, Hong Kong's merchant houses had become the major agents in handling
trade between the new regime and the noncommunist world because the
communist regime tried to export almost everything it could afford in
order to finance imports of machinery and industrial raw materials for
economic reconstruction. This added impetus to the restoration of Hong
Kong's entrepot trade. The effect culminated in the Korean Boom causing
the total exports of Hong Kong to climb up to HK$4,433 million in 1951
(an increase of more than fivefold compared to HK$766 million of 1946).
But the whole picture changed overnight in the middle of 1951 when most of
the trade was choked off by the United Nations embargo, and since then
entrepot trade never regained its pre-eminent position in Hong Kong's
economy. 10 This marked the end of an era in Hong Kong's development.
On the other hand, the inflow of refugees from the Mainland during
and after the Chinese Civil War altered the economic outlook of Hong Kong
10 Exports to Mainland China fell from a record of HK$244 million in
the month of March 1951 to a total of HK$51 million in December of that
year. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Centenary Year 1961,
(Hong Kong, 1961), p. 76.
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and laid the cornerstone for a new course of growth. The development of
manufactures obtained its first impulse from these immigrants, for they
provided local industries with a large reservoir of both skilled and
unskilled labour at low wages, and, in many cases, the necessary know-how
and capital.
By the end of the war Hong Kong had only a few industries such as
shipbuilding and ship repairing, rubber footwear and food processing etc
ll
among which shipbuilding and ship repairing was the most important.
The history of industry in Hong Kong started a new era in 1947 when the
first textile factory came into existence.12 However, prior to 1950, it
was not of much more than local significance though there was some surplus
of cotton yarn for export. The textile industry, including those manu-
factures of made-up garments witnessed phenomenal growth within a few years
and in 1955 it took the top place of manufacturing industry from ship-
building and ship repairing, occupying 60 of the total value of Hong Kong
manufactured goods as well as almost 3090 of the labour force in the
registered and recorded establishments.13 Three other important items
were footwear, enamelware and electric torches. Industrial output increased
at the average of about 30% a year during the period of 1950-1964.14
11 The shipbuilding and ship repairing industry absorbed about 28%
of the labour force in the-registered and recorded establishments.
Szczepanik, op. cit., p. 61.
12 Although there had been some weaving and knitting operations long
before this time, they were of nothing more than cottage size. Ibid.,
pp. 106-107.
13 Ibid., pp. 63 and 106.
14 D.J. Dwyer and Lai Chuen-Yan, The Small Industrial Unit in Hon
Kong: Patterns and Policies, University of Hull Publications, (Hull, 1967),
p. 12.
24
During the immediate postwar years tentative steps were undertaken
to seek overseas markets for inexpensive consumer goods. The labour and
capital inflow from the Mainland provided foundation for the development
of several industries such as rubber footwear, simple metallic and
electrical goods, textiles and clothing. Diversification was the main
feature of industrial expansion during these years. Followed a brief
period of trade stagnation after the Korean Boom, industrialization in
Hong Kong continued in rapid pace reaching the climax in 1958-1960 and
was marked by the fast growth in clothing and plastic manufactures.15 On
the other hand, the expansion of the textile industry which had been
remarkable in the 1950s started to decelerate since the early 1960s owing
to the restrictive measures imposed on this trade and increased competition.
Therefore throughout the 1960s, except clothing which still remained its
relative importance in the manufacturing sector and showed no sign of con-
traction regardless of the increased import controls exercised by the
developed countries, the shares of textiles and footwear in domestic
products had undergone a continuous downward trend. Meanwhile, some com-
paratively new industries such as electronics, toys, watches and clocks
etc. began to take position in the manufacturing sector, notably the
electrical industry which had replaced textiles as the largest single
dollar earner after clothing.
In the past, Hong Kong had relied primarily upon her cost advantage.
But due to rising wages, high land costs and increased competition in the
recent years this advantage has been gradually lost. Thus Hong Kong has
15 Industry in Hong Kong, report prepared by The Economist Intelli-
gence Unit Ltd. for the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, (Hong Kong,
1962), p. 2.
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been undergoing a period of transition in driving towards higher pro-
ductivity and diversifying into more sophisticated and technology-
intensive products. Apart from development in manufactures, Hong Kong
has also recorded fast growth in services markets, particularly tourism
and financial services.
2.2 TRADE PATTERN
In the past three decades, Hong Kong's trade pattern had undergone
drastic changes due mainly to the external political factors which affected
the commercial policies of her major trade partners. The consequence was-
a substitution of domestic exports for re-exports. Thus, prior to the
mid-1950s when entrepot trade was the backbone of the economy, total
trade was two to three times that of the total output, but with the in-
crease in exports of locally-produced goods, total trade was about 1.5
times the gross domestic product in 1966.16
Nevertheless, the substitution of local products for re-export did
not change the export-oriented nature of Hong Kong's economy. The
important role that trade played in the economic development of Hong Kong
could be well supported by the fact that Hong Kong ranked eighteenth in,
terms of foreign trade among the non-communist countries in 1972, despite
of her minute size.17
As shown in Table 2.2, average annual growth rates for total exports
and imports, and those for domestic exports and retained imports were well
over 10/ since the end of the war. As far as long-range growth trend is
16 K.R. Chou, The Hong Kong Economy, (Hong Kong, 1966), p. 38.
17 T. Geiger and F.M. Geiger, op. cit., p. 84.
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Table 2.1
Commodity Trade of Hong Kong, 1950-1975
(HK$ million )a
TotalTotal Domestic b Retained Trade
Re-exports bExportsYear Imports Exports BalanceImports
-721950 420 4923,716 3,788 3,296
-43?4,433 4,8701951 550 3,883 987
-880486 2,4131952 2,899 1,3663,779
-1,1392,734 6351953 1,7742,0993,873
21417 864 1,553 1,8821954 -1,0183,436
-1,1851,003 1,5311955 2,534 2,1883,719





4,978 -2,0402,9291961 9923,930 5,970
-2,270110704,387 6,6571962 5,5873,317
-2,4216,2521,1604,9911963 7,412 3,831






-2,36914,7162189117,6071970 15,238 12, 347
-3,09216,84220,256 13,75017,1641971 3,414
-2,36417, 6094,15519,400 15,2451972 21,764
-3,00622,48019,4741973 29,00525,999 6,525
-4,08426,99522,9111974 7,12530,036 34,120
-3.64026,4996,97333, 47229, 8321975 22,859
a. Throughout this study all dollar values are current unless otherwise
stated.
b. Domestic exports and re-exports were not classified separately prior
to 1959.
c. Retained imports are derived from subtracting re-exports from total
imports.
Sources: Domestic exports of 1950 and 1951 are cited from S.Y. Chung, "The
Role of Manufacturing Industry in the Economy of Hong Kong", in
The Hong Kong Economic Scene, Ed. by J.N. England, University of
Hong Kong, Department of Extra-Mural Studies, Hong Kong, 1959.
Domestic exports of 1952-1958 are quoted from K.R. Chou, op. Cit.,
Table 10, p. 40.-- Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-1967, Census and
Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1969-- Hong Kong Trade Statistics.
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Table 2.2
Commodity Trade of Hong Kona. 1950-1975
(Growth rates%)
Domestic Exports Trade Balance
Total Domestica Retained as% of TotalTotal as% of Total
Exports Imports Exports Exports ExportsYear Imports
-2-334060 111950 36
-1019 29 101 121951 31
-22 -12 -30-35 171952 38
-42-6 231953 313 30
-42-11-12 61954 36 36
-47408 16 161955 5
-4211 1323271956 35
-71-6 4013 81957 35
-54-14-11-1 421958 5
-51810 701959
-39.118.4 21.36.1Average 1950-59 7.8
-49212611 73201960













-1228 75281973 34 33
-1420 76181974 16 18
-12-2-1 -2 7701975
-1414.2Average 1970-75 14.215.0 14.8
-32.515.9.12.6 16.5Average 1950-75 11.6
a. Figures prior to 1959 are not comparable with those of that year and after due
to the difference in trade classification.
Source: Calculated from Table 2.1.
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concerned, they have been most remarkable.18 Among them, domestic exports
achieved the highest average growth rate during the 1960s amounting to
171 indicating the rapid pace of industrialization.19 On the other hand,
during the 1950s retained imports increased at an average rate of 20%
signifying the immediate necessity of Hong Kong to import raw materials
and capital goods to support the foundation of her manufacturing industry
and meet the demand for foodstuffs and consumer goods resulting from the
growth of population.
Exports of Hong Kong almost exclusively consist of manufactures as
95% of the domestic exports are occupied by these products. Yet the com-
position of these goods is highly concentrated in four commodity categories,
namely, clothing, electrical products, textiles and miscellaneous manu-
factured articles (largely toys and games, jewellery and plastic articles),
which together in 1975 accounted for 80% of her total domestic exports.
According to the 1973 Census of Industrial Production, these four commodity
groups constituted nearly 60% of the 1973 gross manufacturing output.20
The remaining 40% of the output (or 20% of total domestic exports) were
comprised by a vast range of goods but none of them alone bore importance
to the manufacturin sector.
18 K.R. Chou, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
19 Although prices began to rise sharply since 1968 causing the growth
rates of domestic exports reach unparallel high values of 26%, 25% and
179 in 1968, 1969 and 1970 respectively, real rates of export growth for
the corresponding years still arrived at the proximity of 17°x, 11% and 5%.
Export prices were quite stable prior to 1968, hence growth rates off`
exports preceding to this year might be quite close to the real rate of
growth. James Riedel, The Industrialization of Hong Kong, (Germany, 1974),
PP. 8-9.
2U Gross manufacturing output in 1973 was HK$31,961 million. 1973
Census of Industrial Production, Department of Commerce and Industry, Hong
Kong, Vol. 1, p. 2.
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Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the absolute values and corresponding shares
of major items of Hong Kong's domestic exports. Among them, clothing
still remained the leading industry dominating over 40% of the 1975
domestic exports. Next were the electrical products constituting 12%
of the total in the same year. Textiles had dropped to the third position
in terms of export importance occupying 9.8% of the 1975 total. Other
large categories included toys and games (7%), watches and clocks (2.8%),
manufactures of metals (2.6%), jewellery and gold and silverware (2.2%),
machinery other than electrical (2.1%), travel goods (2%) and footwear
(1.1%). Hong Kong's reliance on clothing and textiles is abundantly clear
for they contribute to more than half of her export earnings. Both indus-
tries had been exposed to severe import controls imposed by most of the
importing countries and keen world competition. But clothing was able to
overcome these difficulties by diversifying into products of higher-priced
ranges, thus maintained its leading position in the export basket.
Prior to the end of the 1950s, the electrical industry was confined
to the manufacturing of torch batteries and bulbs which together accounted
for 2% of the total value of Hong Kong's exports in 1955.21 The industry
started its intensive growth by about the mid-1960s and was given additional
impetus when the United States urged Japan to exercise voluntary restraint
on her exports of electronic goods to the American market. Meanwhile,
the Japanese products were shifting to higher-priced ranges. As a result,
Hong Kong was able to develop an electrical industry with a wide scope of
products. Now products of this industry, including transistorized radios
and other electronic and electrical components and parts, made up the
next largest category of domestic exports.
21 Szczepanik, op. cit., Table 18, p. 162.
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Table 2.3 Major Items of Hong Kong's Domestic Exports
for Selected Years, 1960-1975 (HK$ million)
BriefSITC
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975Code Description
554.2 590.3 706.9 921.3 1,035.1 1,276.7 1,397.6 1,551.9 2,352.2 2,737.4 2,145.4Textile yarn, fabrics65
made-up articles
145.9 175.7 239.7 344.9 344.8 415.4 520.6 641.1 605.0Manufactures of metal69
12.2 17.3 24.4 27.0 57.6 93.1 86.0 104.3 214.3 316.6 486.9Machinery, other than Electric71
47.3 106.4 186.3 476.1 772.0 1,292.7 1,540.5 1,963.1 2,622.2 3,295.5 2,786.7Electrical machinery,72
apparatus appliances
20.2 31.5 38.7 56.8 124.8 174.8 227.9 301.7 405.4 437.3 455.4Travel goods, handbags etc.831
1,010.3 1,147.4 1,619.7 2,035.4 3,006.1 4,333.4 5,462.9 6,109.2 7,424.9 8,678.3 10,077.8Clothing except fur841
114.5 219.5 174.6 184.2 271.4 302.3 350.8 303.7 266.3 311.2 256.4851 Footwear
4.1 5.0 3.9 24.7 68.6 135.1 175.1 201.8 293.2 509.8 644.4864 Watches clocks
14.0 22.8 29.4 31.2 56.2 108.2 134.6 159.2 244.1 290.6 248.3893 Articles of plastic
materials
116.8 165.5 300.2 466.2 786.8 1,110.9 1,262.4 1,404.5 1,668.9 1,823.2 1,604.6Perambulators, toys894
games etc.
58.3 59.5 1o8.8 184.2 216.6 262.4 421.8 484.0 504.9Jewellery897
8.6 70.4 312.7 828.8 508.4 213.2 99.6 41.2 32.8Wigs899/pt
94.8 115.6 148.9 175.4 187.4 199.9 257.5 302.1 250.6812 Sanitary, plumbing,
lighting fixtures etc.
12.2 39.8 58.2 70.3 8o.6 103.7 141.8 225.4 211.8Scientific instruments and861
apparatus
2,867 3,317 4,428 5,730 8,428 12,347 13,750 15,245 19,474 22,911 22,859Total domestic exports
Source: Hong Kong Trade Statistics
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Table 2.4 Major Items of Hong Kong's Domestic Exports for Selected Years, 1960-1975
(percentage of total domestic exports)
BriefSITC
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975DescriptionCode
Textile yarn fabrics65 19.3 17.8 16.0 16.1 12.3 10.3 10.2 10.2 12.1 11.9 9.4
made-up articles
3.3 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.6Manufactures of metal69
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.1Machinery, other than electric71
1.6 3.2 4.2 8.3 9.2 10.5 11.2 12.9 13.5 14.4 12.2Electrical machinery,72
apparatus appliances
0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0831 Travel goods, handbags etc.
35.2 34.6 36.6 35.5 35.7 35.1 39.7 40.1 38.1 37.9 44.1Clothing except fur841
4.0 3.9 3.9 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.6 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.1851 Footwear
0.1 0.2 0.1 o.4 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5. 2.2 2.8864 Watches clocks
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.1893 Articles of plastic
materials
4.1 5.0 6.8 8.1 9.3 9.0 9.2 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.0Perambulators, toys894
games etc.
1.3 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.2Jewellery897
0.2 1.2 3.7 6.7 3.7 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.1899/pt. Wigs
812 Sanitary, plumbing,
2.1 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1lighting fixtures etc.
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9Scientific instruments861
apparatus
Total domestic exports 2,867 3,317 4,428 5,730 8,428 12,347 13,750 15,345 19,474 22,911 22,859
(HKS million)
Source: Calculated from Table 2.3.
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Recently-developed industries like toys, watches and clocks,
jewellery have witnessed rapid growth since the beginning of the 1970s.
Relatively, watches and clocks achieved the most vigorous expansion
increasing from a mere export value of HK$3.9 million in 1964 to HK$644.4
million in 1975 (as shown in Table 2.3). On the contrary, footwear,
which was one of the major source of export earnings during the early
postwar era, had lagged far behind accounting for a meagre of 1.2% of the
1975 domestic exports. Throughout the 1960s, plastics maintained a re-
latively constant share in exports, and had been gradually shifting from
the production of simple goods of plastic flowers and foliage to more
sophisticated products like toys and dolls.
However, no product like wigs had undergone such great frustration
on its path of development. The wigs industry, developing from an export
value of HK$8.6 million in 1964, reaching its climax at HK$828.8 million
in 1970, dropped drastically to HK$32.8 million in 1975 (a decline of 25
times in five years). The sudden contraction of the wigs industry was
due to the sharp decline in demand for human hair wigs (which constituted
the majority of the wigs export) and was aggravated by the shortage of
suitable synthetic fibre with which to meet the changing demand since 1970.
To sum up, concomitant with the high rate of increase in total trade,
growth in exports of manufactures has been concentrated on certain sectors.
At present, five industries, viz., clothing, electronics, textiles, toys
and games, and watches and clocks dominate the economy of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong's negligible natural resources and industrial structure
significantly dictate her local industries to obtain raw materials and
intermediate goods almost entirely from foreign sources of supply. Table
2.5 shows the commodity composition of imports retained in Hong Kong.
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Table 2.5 Commodity Composition of Retained Imports for Selected Years, 1960-1970
(percentage of total retained imports)
1960 1963 1965 1967 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975Commodity
25.8 24.6 24.3 26.2 21.1 19.2 19.3 19.3 20.2 21.1 .21.4
Foodstuffs
43.0 43.3 41.4 41.6 44.8 44.5 43.9 44.2 45.1 44.3 43.2Raw materials
semi-manufactures
7.7 9.0 10.3 9.5 10.6 12.9 13.3 13.8 12.7 12.5 13.5Capital goods
19.0 18.9 20.4 18.5 20.2 20.4 20.1 19.4 18.9 14.8 14.5Consumer goods
Fuels 4.4 4.2 3.6 4.2 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.1 7.3 7.5
Total retained imports
4,794 6,252 7,462 8,368 12,214 14,715 16,842 17,610 22,480 26,996 26,499(HK$ million)
Total imports
5,864 7,412 8,965 10,449 14,893 17,607 20,256 21,764 29,005 24,120 33,472(HK$ million)
Sources: J. Riedel, or. cit., Table 9, p. 37.
H.K. Review of Overseas Trade, annual issues 1972-75.
34
As of 1975, approximately 80% of the total imports were retained for local
usage, the rest being re-exported.22
Followed by foodstuffs which accounted for 21.4% of the total retained
imports, raw materials and semi-manufactures amounted to 43.2% in 1975
(as shown in Table 2.5). Corresponding shares for consumer goods and
capital goods during the same year were 14.5 and 13.5%. Fuels occupied
the least portion of 7.5%. While there had been a downward movement in
the share of foodstuffs in total retained imports, those of raw materials
and semi-manufactures and capital goods showed an upward shift. This
changing percentage away from foods and favouring raw materials and semi-
manufactures and capital goods is a reflection of the export boom of recent
years.
2.3 DIRECTION OF TRADE
In developing export markets of Hong Kong's manufactures, initiative
was taken by the British and Chinese merchant houses in the early 1950s
which had previously been tied up with manufacturing firms in China through
the handling of their products to East and Southeast Asia. After the
change of regime in the Mainland, many of these manufacturing firms moved
from Shanghai to Hong Kong and they found no difficulty in continuing the
supply through the merchant houses to their former clients as these firms
were known to them.
In spite of the rapid substitution of Hong Kong-made products for
those previously supplied from China, Asia declined as Hong Kong's export
22 In fact, the share of retained imports in the total imports should
be less as a substantial portion of it was re-exported through the hands
of tourists and by bunker services which was not recorded in official trade
statistics. K.R. Chou, op. cit., p. 52.
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market since the mid-1950s due to a number of reasons. First, owing to
the balance of payments problems and, upon their independence, many of
the Asian countries began to build up their own infant industries through
protection. For instance, although Malaysia and Singapore combined had
once in the early 1960s ranked as Hong Kong's third largest market, their
shares decreased substantially over the years. Only Taiwan, which has
made some efforts toward trade liberalization and has shifted from an
import-substitution policy to a relatively more export-orientation one
since the 1960s, has increased her imports of Hong Kong exports. Second,
well-founded Japanese industries revived rapidly after the war and their
products strongly competed with those of other countries in the Asian
markets. Third, the high-income Western countries opened potential
markets for exploration. Besides, the Korean War embargo and the Communist
Chinese Government's trade policy of confining exports and imports to
essential commodities gave rise to the elimination of Mainland China as
a market for the entrepot of Hong Kong.23 In addition, the application
of the production origin restrictions in 1957 and 1958 also resulted in
a sharp decline of Hong Kong exports to Japan, South Korea and the Philip-
pines during the years. Thus the consequence was a decline in total
exports to Asia.
Table 2.6 shows the regional distribution of Hong Kong's domestic
exports. In 1975, Asia took 11.6%, HK32,645 million, of Hong Kong-made
goods with one third of which destinated to Japan. At present, Japan,
23 The total exports of Hong Kong to Mainland China dived from a
share of 33.9% in 1950 to 3.5% in 1959 and to less than 1% in 1975 of
which four-fifth were re-exports. Corresponding figures for those
oriented to Asia were 77.9%, 42.5% and 24.2%. Calculated from data given
in Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-1967 and Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade
1975•
Table 2.6 Direction of Hong Kong's Domestic Exports for Selected Years, 1955-1975
(percentage of total domestic exports)
1975197419731971 19721969 19701967196519631955a 1957a 1960Market
45.045.2 43.540.7 45.54.6 27.628.7 35.535.137.7North America 36.97.9
41.5 40.242.1 42.025.46.6 26.0 32.4 32.1United States 35.034.2 37.43.5
2.72.72.72.22.71.1 1.3 3.4Canada 3.5 3.33.4 3.23.3
29.029.628.414.3 15.7Western Europe 36.434.6 33.930.7 33.432.5 30.135.0
14.5 12.1 12.214.2 14.413.9 12.017.1 17.122.520.4United Kingdom 11.29.9
8.0 12.58.2 10.0 10.71.4Fed. Rep. Germany1.31 7.3 9.87.4 5.53.7 5.7
13.8 11.61o.6 14.412.1 12.4 11.414.423.8 19.2 14.1Asia 64.6 59.7
4.24.64.02.82.6Japan 3.5 3.1 5.53.47.6 3.13.55.8
2.72.8 2.72.3 2.4 2.32.8 2.5 2.28.514.8 12.4Singaporeb 7.0
12.9 13.3 16.513.4 12.5 17.219.1 18.2 16.2Others 16.5 16.7 15.1 12.8
4.54.02.92.7 2.9 2.92.2 2.2 2.72.1Australia 5.73.0 3.0
4.4 4.64.14.1Africa 7.57.5 7.9 7.3 3.9 3.5 5.23.95.7
Total domestic
2,534 3,016 2,867 6,700 10,518 12,347 15,245 19,474 22,911 22,859exports 3,831 113,750I5,02(HK$ million)
a. Total exports
b. Exports destinated to Singapore before 1964 included those departed for Malaya.
Sources: Calculated from data given in Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-1967 and Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade.
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Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia account for more than 70% of the products.
of Hong Kong origin going to Asia. Meanwhile, Asia still remained Hong
Kong's largest entrepot trade partner taking about two third of the 1975
total.
The textile industry was the first modern manufacturing industry in
Hong Kong. A large part of textile products found markets in Asia in the
beginning. After a few small shipments of trial nature had been made to
Britain, which turned out to have great competitiveness with respect to
prices, quality and delivery dates, in addition to the advantage derived
from the Commonwealth Preference, the United Kingdom developed rapidly to
become the major market of Hong Kong textile products. The British market
continued to expand without major setback until 1955 when pressures mounted
to limit the growth of textile imports from Hong Kong. This called for
the need of other outlets. And North America was the next target.
Although Hong Kong found the first extra-regional market for her
goods in Britain, large inroad in the American market was later made
during the late 1950s and soon the United States surpassed Britain as the
largest buyer of Hong Kong products. The highly competitive, fashion
conscious and volatile nature of the American market required Hong Kong
manufacturers to be more alert of its ever-changing conditions. Clothing,
a relatively more sophisticated and diversifiable product among the
textile goods, was able to become highly adaptable to this market. This
was quite contrary to those relatively more standard-type products such
as fabrics, piecegoods and related articles which found their major cus-
tomers in Britain and could be sold either from inventory or to order.
Besides, the more highly competitive nature of the American market ex-
perienced by Hong Kong's manufacturers had another spillover of enhancing
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their ability and eagerness to develop other markets for their products
in Continental Western Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Later, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland,
Italy, Canada and Australia also opened up for considerable shares of
Hong Kong exports.
In 1955, North America and Western Europe together absorbed less than
one fifth, HK$479.6 million, of Hong Kong's total exports (as shown in
Table 2.6). But since then there had been a continuous tendency of
changing in market shares away from Asia and favouring North America and
Western Europe, particulary during the 1960s. As illustrated by Table
2.6, while Asia's intake of Hong Kong-produced goods dropped from 24% to
120 between 1960 and 1970 the United States greatly improved her share
from 26% to 42% over the same period.24 Although Western Europe's share
had been doubled between 1955 and the beginning of the 1960s, it deteriorated
between 1963 and 1970 due mainly to the diminution in Britain's absorption
which had declined from 23% to 12%. But from 1971 onwards, the Western
European market started to expand again because of the growth in the EEC
market, notably the Federal Republic of Germany which took 70% of the EEC
purchase of Hong Kong products in 1975, and had replaced Britain as Hong
Kong's second largest client by that year.
In Asia, Japan had surpassed Singapore as the largest outlet of Hong
Kong exports. But the Japanese market improved not much over the past
ef+ In 1950, the United States took 8.30 of Hong Kong's total exports.
But due to the Korean War embargo the share declined to 2.3% in 1953. From
that year onwards, the United States intake grew continually until the
beginning of the 1970s. C. Van Eaton, Adaptation of a Land-Scarce Econom:
The Economic Growth and Trade of Hong Kong, 1950-19Z, microfilm-xerography
produced by Xerox University Microfilms, (Michigan, 1976), Appendix Table
6:1, pp. 223-227.
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fifteen years due to her trade barriers and informal discrimination against
imported manufactures. In the same period, the Australian market had been
enlarged by 50%. Likewise, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Demark
and Finland) had nearly doubled their intake with Sweden along accounted
for 50%. By the way, though Hong Kong has made some inroads in the Soviet
Russia and Eastern European countries which indeed seem quite attractive
as a vast market for consumer non-durable goods, it is still too early to
draw any conclusion on the extent that this market can be exploited. As
shown in Table 2.6, by the year 1975 the top five markets (all economically
advanced countries), arranged in order of importance, were the United
States (32.1%), the Federal Republic of Germany (12.5/), the United Kingdom
(12.2%), Australia (4.5%) and Japan (4.2•x), which altogether took two third
of Hong Kong's domestic exports with the top market, the United States
taking eight times more than the fifth place market, Japan.
We may also distinguish Hong Kong's market composition by noting the
distribution of domestic exports and re-exports between the developed and
less-developed economies from 1960-1975. The importance of developed
economies to exports of Hong Kong origin is abundantly clear. As demon-
strated by Table 2.7, during the time period under study domestic exports
found their major markets among the developed countries while re-exports
went principally to the less-developed countries. Furthermore, the majority
of the re-exports were destinated to Asia.
On the other hand, owing to the lack of natural resources, Hong Kong
has to import almost everything. Most of the foodstuffs must be imported
as local production is far from sufficient for the mass. 25 Local
25 It is estimated that about 80% of the locally-consumed food is
imported. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Economic Research Centre,
Long-Term Economic and Agriculture Commodit Projections for Hong Kong,
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Source: Calculated from the trade Statistics of Hong Kong.
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industrialists find a large part of their needed materials and inter-
mediate goods from foreign sources. Capital goods are almost entirely
depended upon foreign supply.26 Thus given the import content of her
exports, it is of Hong Kong's vital necessity to acquire cheap and liable
sources of imports so that she can, in turn, sell competitively in world
markets.
Table 2.8 shows the regional distribution of Hong Kong's imports.
Traditionally, Asia still remained the single most principal regional
source reckoning for more than half of the total. However, it does not
follow that the less-developed countries (which constitute most of Asia)
are the major suppliers. Asia ranked high simply because Japan recorded
high in suppling goods to Hong Kong. In fact, the developed world, on
the whole, provided more than half of the goods imported into Hong Kong.
Prior to the end of the 1960s, Mainland China was the single most
important source of goods chiefly because of her dominance in Hong Kong's
foodstuffs imports.27 But she was overtaken by Japan in 1969 as the
largest supplier of Hong Kong imports owing to the latter's pre-eminent
position in providing local industries with the necessary raw materials
and semi-manufactures. Imports from Japan started its intensive growth
since the late 1950s when demand for fabrics created by Hong Kong's rapid
expanding and diversifying clothing industry exceeded the volume and variety
that could be provided by local textile factories. As a result, local
manufacturers turned to'Japan's large and more diversified textile industry
26 Domestic production of capital goods is estimated to account for
less than 10% of the total annual capital formation. Nicholas C. Owen,
Economic Policy in Hong Kong, in Keith Hopkins ed., op. cit., p. 205.
27 Mainland China supplies about half of the foodstuffs consumed in
Hong Kong.
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Table 2.8 Major Sources of Hong Kong's Imports for Selected Years, 1955-197-5
(percentage of total imports)
1973 1974 19751971 197219701969196719651963196019571955Region
62.958.6 59.356.6 59.5Asia 55.2 54.455.456.454.o54.054.457.8
20.920.2 20.924.3 23.223.819.1 23.416.7 17.316.114.814.1Japan
20.319.4 17.617.716.1 16.421.8 18.120.1 25.920.224.1 22.0Mainland China
4.7 4.9 6.02.51.72.32.11.1 1.4Taiwan 5.8 5.2 5.83.4
19.2 19.2 18.2 16.721.9 20.523.8 22.4 20.9 20.823.327.2Western Europe 25.7
8.6 6.68.110.711.3 11.6United Kingdom 11.9 13.0 7.9 5.7 5.19.4 5.9
2.6Fed. Rep. of Germany 3.7 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.13.0 3.63.1 3.1 3.1 3.73.5
2.92.9 2.82.2 2.4 2.8 2.7Switzerland 2.7 2.5 2.1 3.1 3.33.7
North America 13.3 14.110.0 14.3 11.9 14.1 13.9 13.2 12.5 12.511.5 12.1 14.3
United States 8.7 10.5 12.3 10.6 11.1 13.5 13.4 13.2 12.5 11.9 12.8 13.5 11.8
Others 6.5 6.9 8.4 10.3 8.8 8.9 8.49.1 9.4 9.9 9.8 9.5 7.9
Total imports
17,607 20,256 21,764 29,0053,719 5,149 5,864 7,1+12 8, 965 1o,44c, 34,120 33,72(HK$ million) 114,893
Sources: Calculated from data given in Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-1967 and Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade
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to obtain the additional fabrics of cotton and synthetic fibres. During
the 1960s, materials and components for other newly developed industries
such as plastics and electronics were also imported from Japan. In
addition, due to rising income, Hong Kong has become a fast expanding
market for Japanese consumer durable products. Consequently, Japan as a
source of imports gained continually in importance over the years except
for the last few years.
Mainland China's share in Hong Kong's imports had shrunk due to the
diminution in importance of foodstuffs in the total imports. Meanwhile,
Taiwan, another important source of imports, had nearly trebled her share
in the past fifteen years.
An interesting thing occured in the relative importance of North
America and Western Europe as sources of imports to Hong Kong, which
together occupied about one third of Hong Kong's total imports as well as
providing most of her needed capital goods. At least over the 1960s, Hong
Kong's imports from North America increased when there was a downward
shift in the goods of Western Europe origin, and while imports from the
latter started to expand again, those from the former dropped. 28 This
indicated the flexibility of Hong Kong's industry in adjusting to the
changing circumstances by replacing the American goods with the European
ones or vice versa.
To sum up, while Japan's and North America's shares in Hong Kong's
total imports grew steadily from the mid-1950s through the 1960s, Mainland
China's had been undergoing a downward trend during the same period. On
28 During the Korean War embargo Hong Kong's imports from North
America dropped and her imports from Europe expanded. When trade with
the United States recovered trade with Europe started to dwindle. E.V.
Eaton, op. cit., p. 213.
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the other hand, imports from Western Europe as a percentage of the total
had declined gradually over the past two decades due chiefly to the
decrease in importance of the United Kingdom as a supplier. Nevertheless,
the change in distribution of imports was not so radical as that of exports.
Asia maintained its leading position supplying 62.9% of the 1975 total
imports, and was followed by Western Europe and North America each
accounting for 16.7% and 12.5% respectively (as shown in Table 2.8). As
of the same year, major sources of Hong Kong's imports were the following-
in order of importance: Japan (20.9%), Mainland China (20.3%), the United
States (11.8%), Taiwan C5.8%), Singapore (5.7%), the United Kingdom (5.1%),
the Federal Republic of Germany (3.1%) and Switzerland (2.8%).
2.4 SUMMARY
The Second World War marked the end of an era during which Hong Kong
survived on entrepot trade. However, the downfall in re-exports did not
bring Hong Kong's prosperity to an end. On the contrary, Hong Kong con-
tinued to prosper by transforming from an entrepot into an industrial
city. The transformation proceeded with the very much assistance of Hong
Kong's geographical situation and commercial experience accumulated over
the years, and, most important, the influx of capital and manpower from
Mainland China.
Hong Kong is now famous for being a manufacturing centre in world.
Her industry tends to specialize in the manufacturing of a few labour-
intensive consumer goods. Nearly 909/6 of the products are export-oriented
with the majority of which destinated to a handful of the advanced coun-
tries after a period of market reorientation. On the other hand, Hong
Kong still depends on Asia as the major source of raw materials and the
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West as the principal supplier of capital goods. Mainland China main-
tains its dominant position in foodstuffs supply to Hong Kong.
Since Hong Kong is highly dependent on export, she is highly vulner-
able to fluctuations in the level of world trade. The vulnerability is
aggravated by the concentration on a limited range of products and a few
markets. It is conceived that such concentration, whether on products or
markets, gives rise to instability. The introduction of trade restrictions
or the development of competing industries abroad are of great concern to
the manufacturing industries in Hong Kong.
46
Chapter 3 TRADE BARRIERS- TARIFFS
Trade barriers erected by the developed economies have long been
important impediments to the export expansion of the developing world.
These barriers take a variety of forms, such as, discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory tariffs, excise taxes, subsidies to domestic producers,
embargoes, state trading, import licensing and quantitative restrictions.
Despite of their variance in complexity and severity, they can be grouped
under two broad headings: tariff and nontariff barriers. It is indeed
not an easy task to distinguish some of them. In general, tariff barriers
are those which involve import duties of all sorts and nontariff barriers
the rest.
Among them, tariffs and quota restrictions are of great importance
to Hong Kong. Thus, our study to evaluate the impact of trade barriers
on Hong Kong's exports will emphasize on these two aspects. Difficulties
are usually encountered in estimating the probable impact of these
measures on trade flows as it is extremely hard to unravel their effects
for the reason that an importing country rarely relies on one type of
barriers alone. Recognizing this, in our attempt to assess the effects
of the afore-mentioned barriers (tariffs and quota restrictions) on Hong
Kong's manufacturing exports, we aim at analyzing their general develop-
ment through historical perspective instead of trying to provide numerical
estimates of their impact.
Barriers may be eliminated or reduced through trade negotiations.
The extent to which a country can mitigate the burden of barriers imposed
by others on its exports largely depends on its ability to offer concessions
or to retaliate. In this respect, Hong Kong is most vulnerable for she
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has virtually no bargaining power at all. The smallness of Hong Kong's
domestic market and the free trade policy that she attaches to preclude
her from making any offer or threat of retaliation in return of others'
concessions or unfavourable treatment. In fact, Hong Kong has to accept
whatever is offered and the only thing that she can do is to make the
best out of it.
3.1 THE TARIFF ISSUE
Tariffs, which have been universally employed as means of regulating
and controlling international trade before the end of World War II, are
still common means of trade control and regulation. The restrictiveness
of tariffs on imported goods is effected by raising the import price
through the addition of a new cost element, the import duty. There is
always a tendency for those extremists of protection who completely ignore
the benefit of trade and advocate the limitation of imports of any product
to the least possible amount. Thus it is the task of the moderate pro-
tectionist to advocate the fixing of a tariff rate at which reasonable
access is allowed for foreign products. The rate should be high enough
for domestic producers to cover production costs in addition to a profit
margin, but should not be too high as to stop import altogether and burden
consumers, which would jeopardize foreign producers and cause retaliation.
Tariffs may seriously reduce trade but they seldom stop it entirely.
The door is left open for foreign suppliers if they can reduce their costs
or improve the quality of their product. On the other hand, if quota
restrictions are used, the way can be completely barred so that not even
an additional unit of import is permitted. If tariff is used as a measure
for import restriction, it is extremely difficult to predict exactly what
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effect a given rate of duty will have on the quantity of goods imported.
There is a strong tendency for the tariff makers to err on the high side
and, as a result, imports may actually be reduced more than what is
intended. Thus, it is argued that under certain circumstances a tariff
may be more restrictive than a quota. Nevertheless, protectionists will
almost consistently preferred quota. For after a certain time period
improvements in productive efficiency may offset the tariff effect and
allow foreign producers to resume their old place in the market. This is
what the protected interests want to prevent, and a quota can serve the
purpose effectively. The foreign producer can do very little in confronta-
tion with a quota restriction.
However, a tariff may serve the purpose of a quota as well. It can
be progressively increased in parallel with improvements in the efficiency
of foreign suppliers, thus remains unimpaired as a protective barrier. On
the other hand, a quota may theoretically serve the purpose of a stabilized
tariff. The restricted quantity can be relaxed after some time to offer
consumers the opportunity of enjoying cheaper or better quality foreign
products. In short, the effectiveness of a tariff as a trade. barrier will
decline as foreign efficiency increases but a quota, once being imposed,
can be left alone to impede trade flows without the necessity of making
further adjustments. Those who are in favour of increasing. imports will
have to secure positive government action to increase the quota. Hence
in the case of tariff, the advantage lies on the side of those who favour
more imports as all they have to do is to retain the status quo. That is
the reason why protected interests prefer quota as the last resort to
curb imports.
As tariff affects the price differential between local and foreign
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products, it directly alters the relative competitive position of domestic
producers versus foreign suppliers as a whole, as well as that among the
exporting countries themselves. The extent to which an individual foreign
producer may be affected depends upon his ability to absorb the effect of
the tariff change. He may retain his place in the market and remain
unimpaired if he can offset the effect of a tariff increase by reducing
his production costs. On the other hand, the foreign supplier may be
unable to reap the benefit of a tariff preference if he cannot cope with
the market demand and increase supply without entailing greater costs.
A tariff increase reduces the competitive position of the exporting
countries. But this adverse effect is not necessarily felt by these
countries evenly, depending on their ability to adjust themselves to the
changed conditions. Besides, tariff changes may, instead of across-the-
board, affect specific imported items only. Thus, the extent to which an
individual exporting country will be affected, depends on its export
basket. Sometimes tariffs discriminate certain foreign suppliers and
favour the others. For instance, in the case of tariff preference, the
competitive position of the beneficiaries will be improved vis-a-via all
others.
It has been noted that the graduated tariff structure (on the basis
of which tariff rates escalate by stage of production) applied in the
industrial countries tends to discriminate against exports of manufactures
from the developing economies. It discourages the developing countries
to export their commodities in processed form. But the graduation of
tariff does not proceed endlessly. For those skill- and technology-
intensive products such as electrical machinery and transport equipment
which cannot be produced economically in the developing countries due to
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the absence of the necessary technological and managerial know-how, duties
are relatively low.1
Tariffs have declined in importance as obstacles to trade comparing
to other measures such as quantitative restrictions, exchange control and
state-trading operations since the implementation of tariff reductions
under the GATT negotiations. In fact, tariffs are no more considered
effective measures to restrict imports since they have to be progressively
increased with the improvements in foreign productive efficiency if they
are to remain effective. Yet continuous upward adjustment of tariff rates,
especially those bound by commercial treaties, may strain foreign-relations
and incur retaliation. Besides, in the case where the supply of the
imported product is relatively inelastic, duties will fail to protect local
producers. Under these circumstances, countries resort to other types of
import controls, the most popular being quantitative import restrictions.
3.2 EFFECTS OF TARIFF BARRIERS ON HONG KONG'S EXPORTS
Since the majority of Hong Kong's exports are labour-intensive manu-
factures of which the advanced countries are the main consumers, in our
attempt to assess the impact of tariff barriers on her exports, we shall
concentrate on these types of manufactures and on markets in the developed
countries. Therefore, firstly, we have to study the main trend of tariff
changes in these products and markets. And then we shall investigate in
what way these changes have affected Hong Kong. In this connection, we
must recognize three major developments in international trade which had
1 Bela Balassa, The Impact of the Industrial Countries' Tariff
Structure on their Imports of Manufactures from Less-Developed Areas,
Economica, Vol. 34 (November 1967), pp. 372-383•
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special significance for Hong Kong's exports since the end of the war.
The first one is the Commonwealth Preference System which had its origin
in the 1930s. Second is the GATT negotiations on tariff reduction. The
third one is the GSP schemes granted by the developed countries to exports
of manufactures from the developing countries under UNCTAD.
3.2.1 Commonwealth Preference
The system of Commonwealth Preference was initiated in 1932 after the
Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa with the purpose of protecting
Commonwealth exporters from the trade-restricting effects of protectionist
measures introduced by Britain in that year. Actually, even before Ottawa,
imports of Britain from the Commonwealth countries were enjoying an average
rate of preference of 2-3%.2 But the system was generalized in 1932
requiring that Britain would keep a two-tier system of tariffs- the CPA
(Commonwealth-Preference Area) rate for imports from the Commonwealth
countries and the Full (or most-favoured-nation) rate for those from other
sources.3
The average margin of preference on all imports, marked by the abso-
lute difference between the Full and CPA rates, culminated about 1937
amounting to 10-12%. Over 60% of the imports from the Commonwealth
countries were accorded preference in the British market (compared with
only 7% in 1929) having an average margin of 19-20%, with many individual
2 Donald MacDougall and Rosemary Hutt, Imperial Preference: A
Quantitative Analysis, Economic Journal, Vol. 64 (June 1954), pp. 233-257.
3 Actually, it turns out to be a three-tier system of tariffs if the
duty rates for imports from EFTA countries are considered separately. But
here we ignore the EFTA rate.
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margins much higher.T But since'then, the preferential margin had been
continuously lowered owing to the world-wide trend of tariff reduction
achieved by successive rounds of GATT negotiations and other trade agree-
ments after the war, in addition to the large rise in prices which had
reduced the ad valorem incidence of specific duties. In 1957, the margin
had declined to 5.5% but risen to 7.2% in 1963 due to the increase in the
share of manufacturing exports (which had a higher preference) from the
Commonwealth countries to the British Market.5 The margin of preference
tends to rise as the capability of the Commonwealth countries to export
manufactures increases. Thus, a margin of this order can serve as an
incentive to the industrial development of developing Commonwealth
countries.6
As part of the Commonwealth, Hong Kong is qualified to enjoy pre-
ferential treatment from the United Kingdom and a number of Commonwealth
countries. In 1962, 61% of Britain's imports from the Preference Area
enjoyed preferential tariff treatment. A number of countries including
MacDougall' and Hutt argued that the increase in the average margin
of preference in the 1930s was due mainly to the increasing of tariffs
on imports from countries other than CPA rather than by reducing tariffs
on imports from the Commonwealth countries. MacDougall and Hutt$ op. cit.
5 Maxwell Stamp and Harry Cowie, Britain and the Free Trade Area
Option, in New Trade Strategy for the World Econom, edited by H.G.
Johnson, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., (London, 1969), p. 186.
6 Green showed that despite the continuous trend of erosion the
preference margin was, however, slightly higher in 1964 than in 1962
because the increased proportion of manufactured goods overall in 1964
compared with 1962 and particularly of certain manufactures enjoying
higher margins might have outweighed the adverse effect of world-wide
tariff concessions on the margin. R.W. Green, Commonwealth Preference:
United Kingdom Customs Duties and Tariff Preferences on Imports from the
Preference Area, Board of Trade Journal, 31 December 1965, pp. 1551-1558.
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Hong Kong enjoyed preference on 90% or more of their exports. In fact,
Hong Kong was among the few of all countries in the Area which enjoyed
the highest average margin due to her high proportion of exports in
manufactured and semi-manufactured products, many of which were admitted
free of duty. As of 1962, the share of Hong Kong exports to the British
market enjoying preference was as high as 97%. All but 4% of British
imports from Hong Kong were free of duty in that year the dutiable imports
were mainly textile goods and clothing. Margins of imports such as
textiles, clothing, footwear and toys etc. ranged up to 25% or more resul-
ting in an average margin on all imports from Hong Kong of nearly 19% in
1962 (compared with that of 17% in 1957).7
Since the 1950s, by exploiting the advantage bestowed upon her by the
Commonwealth Preference, Hong Kong had successfully built up herself as the
major supplier of light manufactures, especially textiles and clothing to
the Commonwealth Preference Area among the developing Commonwealth countries.
At that time, her superiority in textile export was under no challenge except
probably India. And despite of the growing restrictions on textile trade
the Commonwealth Area still remains the largest buyer of Hong Kong's textile
product. As indicated in Table 3.1, except the United States, the top four
importers of Hong Kong's textiles are Commonwealth countries which together
have taken 44.5% of the total in 1975. Table 3.2 shows that textiles still
occupies large shares in Hong Kong's exports to the Commonwealth countries.
However, starting from the 1960s, Hong Kong has experienced a gradual
erosion of the Commonwealth preferential treatment she enjoyed. Apart
from the tariff reductions implemented under the GATT negotiations,
Ibid.
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Table 3.1 Leading Importers of Hong Kong Textiles (SITC 65)
(in percentages)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
15.4 14.5 16.8 17.9 15.7 16.5 23.1 21.0 24.2 23.1 20.2 22.6 23.2 18.7 18.2 17.1United States
35.3 29.7 38.2 31.1 28.7 29.4 26.8 27.5 26.4 24.2 20.5 25.9 23.5 16.5 16.2 19.CUnited Kingdom
5.1 3.0 5.5 5.3 7.0 7.0 5.8 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.4 9.4 8.9 12.6 13.2 13.7Australia
3.7 3.7 4.8 6.4 6.9 7.3 6.1 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.7 7.6 6.1 6.7 8.6 6.4New Zealand
5.8 4.0 4.1 5.0 6.5 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.7 6.4 5.2 5.4Singapore
3.7 2.6 3.7 4.3 3.5 3.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.2 2.4 3.3South Africa
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
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Table 3.2 Share of Textiles in Hong Kong Exports to Selected Markets
(in percentage)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
11.5 14.3 11.3 11.9 9.0 8.0 10.4 7.9 7.2 5.9 5.0 5.5 5.9 6.4 6.7 5.0United States
8.7 11.6 4.8 8.4 7.3 6.4 5.2 4.3 3.1 2.9 4.0 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.6
.EED- six
0.5 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 6.0 3.1 3.0 14.6 2.5 2.6Japan
33.4 33.7 31.6 23.3 20.9 28.5 25.0 22.4 20.4 18.6 17.7 18.6 16.6 13.8 16.0 14.7United Kingdom
32.8 32.8 38.1 40.5 44.2 44.1 41.7 40.9 38.1 35.5 33.4 32.7 31.0 38.5 27.9 28.5Australia
26.8 23.4 25.0 28.5 31.3 31.0 26.7 23.9 25.3 28.0 22.9 18.6Singapore
52.5 54.7 56.8 54.1 43.4 45.6 35.7 28.0 27.3 21.8 16.0 13.9 19.2 16.9 23.9 31.3South Africa
64.3 68.9 79.2 75.5 84.2 84.8 86.7 85.1 81.o 84.5 81.o 84.3 78.6 81.6 78.7 76.0New Zealand
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
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especially upon the conclusion of the Kennedy Round (which resulted in
the reduction of the average margin of preference given by the United
Kingdom for imports from the developing Commonwealth by about 40%),8
several other developments call for brief description. Since the early
1960s, South Africa had continuously imposed a series of anti-dumping
duties against certain imports from Hong Kong. Meanwhile, both Singapore
and Malaysia had gradually abandoned their Commonwealth Preference systems
since the mid-1960s, and in 1966 the former had removed part of her
Commonwealth Preference while the latter increased the preference duties
to the full most-favoured-nation rate on a large number of. items. All
these developments had significant effects on Hong Kong. Consequently,
the value of Hong Kong exports enjoying preference destinated to the
Commonwealth except Britain started to decline from its peak in the mid-
1960s and never recovered.
In addition to these major erosions of the margins, the value of
Commonwealth Preference to the developing member states was further
diluted when in January 1972 the United Kingdom introduced her GSP scheme.
For those products which were covered by the scheme, the Commonwealth
beneficiaries would have to share their Commonwealth preferences with other
beneficiary countries under the scheme. The average margins of preference
obtained by Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth GSP beneficiaries were 6.2%
and 5.1% respectively.9 But much more important is that as Britain has
6 Harry H. Bell, Trade Relations with the Third World: Preferential
Aspects of Protective Structures, in The United States and International




been accorded membership by EEC, her Commonwealth Preference will be
abandoned by 1977.
The Commonwealth Preference has undergone additional deterioration
when Britain increased her CPA rate on cotton woven textiles from nil to
85% of the full rate. As a result, the proportion of Hong Kong I s exports
to the British market qualified for Commonwealth Preference has begun to
contract, amounting to about 50% of the total in 1974/75 (compared to
97% in 1962).10 As can be seen from Table 3.3, the market shares of Hong
Kong's major exports to the United Kingdom have declined in the more
recent years, while others like the United States, Taiwan, South Korea
ll
and Japan have achieved remarkable access to the market in these items.
3.2.2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Since its establishment, GATT has played active role in leading the
world towards a free trade system. It serves as a forum for negotiations
among countries in regarding tariff reduction and the removal of other
trade barriers. Under its auspices successive rounds of tariff negotia-
tions had been held. Among them, the Kennedy Round achieved the most
significant result of having an average tariff out of 35% on broad commo-
dity groups, especially manufactures.
However, GATT has not been confronted with no problem. Many develo-
ping countries accused that GATT did not look eager to settle their
10 Calculated from data given in 1974/75 Annual Statistical Review,
Department of Commerce and Industry, (Hong Kong, 1975, Table 3, p. 3.
11 Substantial growth in market share has been experienced by Taiwan,
South Korea and the United States in textiles and clothing Japan in
electrical machinery and miscellaneous manufactured articles Italy and
South Korea in footwear.
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Table 3.3
Market Shares of Major Items in Hong Kong
Exports to the United Kingdom
(in percentages)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
41.8Clothing 38.2 32.639.6 37.0 32.6
8.9Textiles 8.1 6.6 6.27.5 5.9
Miscellaneous manufactured
6.98.210.1 7.6 7.1 5.7
articles
1.22.4 1.8Electrical machinery 2.3 2.41.7
4.64.84.44.oManufactures of metal 3.2 3.0
13.917.6Footwear 22.324.9 7.79.2
Source: Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade, 1974, 1975.
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development problems as tariff reductions mainly succeeded in manufactures
while agricultural commodities, their main concern, were seldom touched.
They claimed that the GATT provisions were inadequate for dealing with
agricultural trade and nontariff barriers which remained widespread in
this field. Furthermore, contrary to the spirit of GATT, quantitative
restrictions were legitimized on the basis of market disruption with
the purpose of preventing expansion of exports by the less developed
countries which existing high tariffs could not restrain.
Unlike many of the developing countries, Hong Kong has hardly been
affected by the aforesaid situation except in the case of quantitative
restrictions on textiles since Hong Kong's exports are almost exclusively
manufactures. Thus, she has been able to reap the benefits of general
tariff reductions on manufactured goods. Among these negotiations, only
those of the Dillon and Kennedy Round will be of relevance to the time
series taken in our study.
The Dillon Round, concluded in 1962, had succeeded in a 20% tariff
cut. According to the investigation undertaken by J.M. Finger on United
States imports, during 1960-1965 a large part of the increase in manu-
facturing exports of the developing countries' interest to the American
market was attributabe to the cost differential between the United States
and the developing world. Tariff reductions were virtually unimportant
as a stimulus. But he then stated that for those manufactures which were
of the developed countries' interest, not only their supply from the
developing countries increased significantly but they also respond
sensitively to the marginal incentive of the tariff reductions. 12 Thus,
12 J.M. Finger, op. cit.
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even though the Dillon Round chiefly affected typical exported manufactures
of the advanced country basket to the United States, and from which the
developing world had benefited little, this conclusion might not necessarily
be applicable to Hong Kong considering her outstanding position in the
exporting of a-typical developing country exports of manufactures (the
developed country basket) among the less developed nations during the mid-
1960s. Thus, the effects of the Dillon Round concessions on exports of
Hong Kong should not be underrated.
The Kennedy Round was concluded in 1967 with effective in five stages
from 1968 to 1972. It is by far the most successful round of tariff
negotiations resulting in an average tariff cut of 35%. Its effects were
more distinguishable. By comparing the big reduction (tariff reduction)
and small reductiongroups of manufactured exports from the developing
countries to the United States, EEC and Japan, Finger found that tariff
cuts did have stimulating effect on the developing countries' exports and
the product supply of these countries showed alertness to the marginal
incentive of tariff reductions.
During these time, Hong Kong's exports of manufactures had undergone
rapid growth part of which could be attributed to the tariff concessions
accorded by the industrial countries. With a few exceptions like the
United Kingdom which had a relatively tardy economic growth, and South
Africa, New Zealand and the Irish Republic, which still largely leaned on
nontariff measures, fast inroads had been made to a number of countries.
Remarkable success had been won in the American market which expanded from
a share of 26% of the total manufactured exports of Hong Kong in 1960 to
42.1% in 1969. Sizeable increase was also recorded in EEC (particularly
in the Federal Republic of Germaryy) where the share climbed up from 5.8%
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to 10.6% in the same period. Even France which had been operating on a
highly restrictive import licensing system had witnessed a steady increase
in intake of Hong Kong products. Meanwhile, exports to Australia and
Japan also increased along with successive tariff reductions as the
quantitative restrictions they erected were gradually relaxed. Other new
markets including Austria and Switzerland etc. had registered rapid access
by Hong Kong products over the years. Detailed developments of Hong Kong's
exports in various markets are shown in Table 3.4.
However, during the years Hong Kong had, like others, been affected by
certain tariff measures instituted sporadically by her major trade partners
such as the British 15% surcharge imposed in 1964-1965 and the American
temporary sur-tax of 10% in late 1971. Austria, since 1965, and Australia
in 1967-1968, had imposed anti-dumping duties on certain items of Hong Kong
textiles. But these had not cause serious damage to Hong Kong exports
owing to her ability to adjust herself under these adverse conditions.
For some time, the cost differential between Hong Kong and her markets
did contribute to the rapid expansion of exports. But considering Hong
Kong's size relative to the vast market, inflationary pressures had also
been generated. Moreover, since tariff cuts had been accorded to all the
developing countries many of which had shifted into export orientation,
it signified more intensive competition from the less developed countries.
In an attempt to maintain her competitive advantage, Hong Kong has
to switch products and markets. There has been a downward shift in world
trade during 1974 and 1975 where economic recession prevailed. But
exports of Hong Kong continued to grow in certain markets such as the
Federal Republic of Germany despite of the adverse environment. The
situation would have been worse if Hong Kong had not been able to shift
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Table 3.4 Shares of Selected Markets in Hong Kong Exports
(in percentages)
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
26.0 26.5 27.7 35.5 41.4 42.0 41.5 40.2 35.0 32.4 32.1United States
2.7 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.7 3.4Canada
20.4 21.5 21.9 17.2 15.9 12.0 14.2 14.4 14.5 12.1 12.2United Kingdom
5.5 6.8 9.7 11.4 8.7 11.5 11.8 13.9 14.4 15.5 17.1EEC- six
Federal Republic of 3.7 4.6 6.6 7.3 5.9 8.0 8.2 10.0 9.8 10.7 12.5
Germany
. 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.,2 0.2 0.3Finland
1.2 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1Sweden
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8Norway
0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 o.8 0.8 0.8Denmark
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8Switzerland
. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9Austria
. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1Irish Republic
3.5 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.5 2.1 5.5 4.6 4.2Japan
.. 3.4 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.8 2.7 2.7Singapore
1.4 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.0South Africa
3.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.6 5.7 4.5Australia
1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9. 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.8New Zealand




into these markets in recent years. The standardization of Hong Kong
products and similar taste in the markets of developed countries have
facilitated this switchover.
3.2.3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
The need for the developing countries to attain better access for
their exports of both manufactures and primary products to the industrial
countries' markets has become most palpable in the 1960s. The less
developed countries expressed their hope to obtain more favourable treat-
ment for their exports from the rich nations because they thought that
measures undertaken by the rich leading to the removal of trade restric-
tions were limited in scope for their exports. The argument was based on
the fact that the concept of horizontal equity (each supplier treated
equally) embodied in the principle of nondiscrimination was recognized as
unfair to poor countries which were at a competitive disadvantage in the
industrial countries, and hence they deserved preferential treatment in
these markets. By according special trade concessions to the developing
economies, it is thought, tariff preference would provide an element of
vertical equity (unequals treated unequally) which was necessary
considering the economic disparity between the rich and the poor.13 Thus,
with the support of the Soviet Bloc, the developing countries urged to
set up a permanent organization specialized in dealing with their trade
and development problems. This led to the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964,
from which emeged the proposal of duty-free treatment for manufactured
13 Ingo Walter and Jae W. Chung, Non-tariff Distortions and Trade
Preferences for Developing Countries, Kyklos, Vol. XXIV (Fasc. 4 1971),
pp. 733-750.
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and semi-manufactured exports of the developing countries. Although
UNCTAD has a host of problems on hand to deal with, only the tariff-
preference issue is of relevance to our study here.
Actually, the idea of trade preferences for poor nations was not a
new one. A committee had been appointed by GATT in the late 1950s to
open up discussions for the possibility of granting nonreciprocal
preferential treatment by the developed contracting parties to the less
developed ones. Yet in global context, it did not start to gain force
until inter-governmental action was taken within the OECD after the second
UNCTAD in 1968. Originally, the attitude of the developed nations towards
tariff preferences was not favourable. Some supported this proposal while
others refused to make any commitment before having much considerations.
The United States, which put more stress on the benefits that could be-
derived from the Kennedy Round, opposed to the suggestion on the basis of
nondiscrimination. Eventually, after long-drawn inter-governmental con-
sultations, agreement was reached in 1970 and the various schemes of GSP
submitted by the advanced countries entered into force in the early 1970s.
The GSP schemes offered by the rich countries varied substantially
in respect of product coverage, preference margin and safeguard. 14 Never-
theless, they generally offer preferential tariff elimination or reduction
on industrial products listed in BTN 25-99 except those specified in the
negative lists', and selected agricultural products (BTN 1-24) itemized
14 The safeguards built in the various GSP schemes are mechanisms
employed to protect domestic producers against disruption caused by large
inflow of products from the preference-receiving countries.
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in the 'positive lists'.1-7 In most cases, textiles and footwear are
denied preferential treatment.
Being.the first, Australia introduced her GSP in 1966. It is highly
selective with respect to products, margins of preference granted and
beneficiary countries on the basis of the competitive need principle.
And preferences are limited by tariff quotas arbitrarily set to avoid
jeopardizing domestic industry. The EEC implemented its scheme in 1971
offering tariff-quota for preferential imports. The United Kingdom version
of GSP, effected in 1972, ran parallel with her Commonwealth Preference
s stem.i6 The British scheme affected the industrial products falling
Y within BTN 25-99 excluding mainly various textiles, hydrocarbons and several
relatively minor items subject to revenue duties. The Japanese scheme was
effective in two phases which took place in 1971 and 1972 respectively.
Preferences were limited to 50% tariff reductions for a considerable range
of products including hydrocarbons, footwear and apparel. Canada and
Ireland offered a one-third tariff reduction except textiles for the former
and several groups of industrial products for the latter. With the excep-
tion of most textiles, Switzerland and Austria provided linear 30% reduc-
tions, while the New Zealand-scheme granted Commonwealth Preference to a
specific list of products from all the developing countries. The United
1? BTN denotes Brussels Tariff Nomenclature classification of pro-
ducts entering international trade. BTN 25-99 comprise of industrial
manufactures, semi-manufactures, raw materials and fuels, while BTN 1-24
constitute agriculture-based commodities. Ingo Walter and Jae W. Chung,
op. cit.
16 Britain, along with Demark and the Republic of Ireland, conformed
to EEC practice as regards the scheme from 1974, and started to abolish
her Commonwealth Preference.
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States, being the latest, announced her scheme in 1976.
As might have been expected, due to her excellent performance in the
exporting of manufactures among Ithe developing countries, Hong Kong would
always be a borderline case in the considerations of preference-giving.17
Finally she was included in the GSP schemes except, in most cases, foot-
wear and textiles which had already been under quantitative restrictions
for years in major markets. 18
As the United States and EEC are now the two largest markets for Hong
Kong exports, it may deserve to examine in some detail the GSP schemes
they implemented. The EEC scheme operates under a complicated three-way
tariff quota mechanism- the ceiling, butoir and subquota. The most
fundamental concept is the ceiling which represents the maximum amount of
the product that is allowed to enter EEC. The magnitude of the ceiling
equals the imports from the beneficiaries in 1968 (basic element) plus 5%
of the imports from nonbeneficiaries in 1969 (supplementary element). How-
ever, the ceilings are not applied inflexibly. For products on the sensi-
tive lists, preferences will be withdrawn once the limits are reached and
full duties will be effective immediately for further imports. But for
nonsenitive goods, total imports from the beneficiary countries may be
permitted to exceed the ceilings. The ceilings are subdivided into butoirs
(the maximum participation shares of the beneficiaries). The purpose is
to prevent the most competitive developing-country beneficiaries from
17 Hong Kong was not included in the American scheme until she
announced to abolish her Commonwealth Preference for liquor, manufactured
tobacco and motor vehicles.
18 In 1974, EEC announced to'include in its GSP scheme Hong Kong's
certain textiles and footwear (other than leather) from 1975. But textiles
and footwear from South Korea and Singapore had already been included from
the very beginning.
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grasping the entire amount within the ceiling. The butoir limit is
fundamentally set at 50% of the ceiling. But for most sensitive, many
quasi-sensitive, and some non-sensitive goods it is only 20% or 30%. On
the other hand, allegedly based on the principle of equitable burden-
sharing among member states, sub-quotas (internal ceilings) for imports
entering individual member states are arbitrarily allocated according to
the following percentage "key": Germany 37.5% France 27.1% Italy 20.3%
and Benelux 15.1%.19
The American scheme is somewhat similar in nature but less complex
and more liberal than the EEC one. Manufactured goods other than import-
sensitive products are the major benefited items. In regarding market share
all beneficiaries are equally treated. With the exception for those pro-
ducts which are not manufactured in the United States, the individual
beneficiary will be denied preferential treatment for those products in
which it supplies either 50% of the amount of total United States imports
or more than US$25 million on an annual basis.
Because impetus has been provided for manufactured exports of the
developing countries since the Kennedy Round, it is rather difficult to
assess how much additional incentive these schemes have provided. Besides,
events occured in the 1970s such as exchange rate reforms, energy crisis
and the world-wide economic recession preclude us from isolating the effect
of the schemes from the entangled situation. However, based on recent
UNCTAD estimates, if all GSP schemes came into effect in 1973, only 16% of
dutiable imports or 8% of all imports from the developing Asian countries
19 See Trade Relations with the Third World: Emerging Patterns of
Trade Preferences by Harry H. Bell in Robert G. Hawkins and Ingo Walter
ed., op. Cit., pp. 335-373.
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would have benefited from GSP. If only the EEC version was taken into
account, corresponding figures would be 13% and 4%. In respect of Hong
Kong, only 10% of her exports were covered by the Japanese GSP scheme in
1972, and 25% would have been benefited from the America's in 1973.20
Some of the. negative aspects of the GSP schemes which may be of some
relevance to Hong Kong's position deserve examination here. Since the
more advanced developing countries have a wider range of manufactures to
export, hence are at a competitive advantage, it is conceivable that they
will be more liable to reap most benefits from the preferences. However
the safeguard mechanism built into the schemes prohibit these countries
from going too far in exploiting the benefits derived from preferences.
As in the case of the EEC scheme, the butoir restrictions limit the more
advanced beneficiaries from getting the best out of the preferences granted
to them. Utilization of the EEC scheme was at an average of only 66% in
1974.21 Even though the five developing nations including Hong Kong toge-
ther accounting for 50% of the EEC imports under GSP have the capacity of
exporting more to the Community, they will find difficulties in doing so
because their preferences would be denied once they reach their butoir
limits. Moreover, the internal ceilings for imports into individual mem-
ber states restrict a beneficiary to concentrate its exports on one or two
markets, thus lower the effective GSP the beneficiary can enjoy. Hence it
is necessary for those beneficiary countries such as Hong.Kong, which have
traditionally been major suppliers of certain products to one or two
20 Report by Dick Wilson in Far Eastern Economic Review, op. cit.
21 Report by Malcolm Subham in Far Eastern Economic Review, op. cit.
69
markets, to diversify their exports within the Community. Similar result
occured in the American scheme as estimates in 1971 showed that only 10%
of all United States dutiable imports from the poor countries would have
been eligible-for preference after the rule of the US$2.5 million-50%
limitation is applied, instead of 40% before its application.22
Meanwhile, GSP schemes tend to discriminate against the more com-
petitive beneficiaries and favour the less ones. Classification of
preference-receiving countries and the preference they can enjoy are re-
viewed annually and will be adjusted according to the countries' "competi-
tive need" in respect of products itemized in the preferential list. Thus,
an efficient beneficiary may find it difficult to improve access for its
exports. Consequently, the more advanced beneficiaries will find themselves
facing a keener competition as the less advanced ones gradually develop
their ability to export manufactures by taking advantage of the higher
effective GSP schemes they can enjoy.
Therefore, despite of the success in the exporting of manufactures
that Hong Kong has achieved over the years, she will find it more difficult
than ever to sustain this accomplishment owing to the discriminatory
effects of the GSP schemes and growing competition.
3.3 SUMMARY
Although tariffs are still widely used as an instrument to restrict
imports, their effectiveness have been largely offset by a series of tariff
concessions under the auspices of GATT parallel with the improvements in
productive efficiency over the years. The most direct method to assess the
22 See Guy F. Erb, "The Developing Countries in the Tokyo Round" in
The United States and the Developing World-- Agenda for Action 1974, edited
by James W. Howe, (Overseas Development Council, 1974), pp. 85-94.
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effect of tariff is by comparing the exports of products which have been
affected by tariff changes with those which have not been affected.
However, this requires strong assumptions of neutrality of all factors
other than tariffs, such as quantitative restrictions, so that the effect
of tariff changes under scrutiny may be isolated. This approach is more
appropriate for short-term analysis of one tariff adjustment. Thence, it
would be very complicated, if not inappropriate, for our study, which
covers a time period of more than two decades overlapping with various and
continuous tariff developments, to adopt this approach in the evaluation of
tariff effects. Therefore, we try to perceive the impact of tariff on
Hong Kong's exports through a historical review of tariff developments
which have affected Hong Kong during the postwar years.
In addition to the economic expansion of the advanced countries, three
major developments in tariff are thought to be of particular concern to
Hong Kong's export growth. In the first place, it was the Commonwealth
Preference which provided the first impetus to the development of Hong
Kong's manufacturing industries, particularly cotton textiles. By exploi-
ting the advantage of Commonwealth preferential treatment, Hong Kong was
able to have a head-start on other developing countries in building up her
industrial base. But the most important one was the general trend of
tariff reductions undertaken by the developed countries, which culminated
in the 1960s. During this decade, Hong Kong was in the most favourable
position since her start in export drive.. On the one hand, she was able
to take advantage of tariff liberalization by increasing her cheap
manufactures to the markets of the developed countries on the other hand,
she was well ahead in the exportation of manufactures comparing with other
less developed countries. This made her superiority in exports of
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manufactures hard to be challenged. Although Hong Kong had sporadically
come across some unfavourable tariff treatments, she was capable of
adapting herself to the adverse situations by changing her market and
product compositions. However, towards the end of the 1960s, as more of
the developing countries became able to reap the benefits from the tariff
cuts and gained in capacity of producing a wider range of manufactures,
and many of them witnessed remarkable success in shifting into production
for export markets, Hong Kong was confronted with a keener competition.
Relatively speaking, these countries have even lower labour cost. The
effect of GSP under UNCTAD is hard to be ascertained. At least it may not
be a blessing to the more advanced less-developed countries like Hong Kong
due to the discriminatory elements built into many of the schemes.
Nevertheless, the average tariff level in the developed countries at
present is so low that further reduction is likely to induce resistance
from domestic protected interests. Indeed, tariffs have lost their
significance as trade hinderance comparing to the nontariff issues. The
developing countries as a whole may not be too concerned with the success
in further tariff reductions in the Tokyo Round. They show much eagerness
in the elimination of nontariff barriers. After all, general tariff
reductions may have the effect ,of undercutting the margin of preference
they obtain in the GSP.
72
Chapter 4 NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIERS- QUOTAS
Nontariff trade barriers include all measures other than tariffs, which
tend to distort, directly or indirectly, the volume, or product-composition
of international trade. Many of them are employed as instruments of
commercial policy, e.g., quotas, subsidies to import-competitors, and
variable levies. Quantitative restriction which usually takes the form of
import quotas is the most prominent one.
Some of the nontariff measures, such as packaging and marking require-
ments, psytosanitary regulations, customs valuation and classification
practices, are sporadically employed with trade-restriction as the prime
target, while certain other measures are taken for nontrade purposes but
embodied with trade restrictive effects, 6.g., certain types of consumption
taxes and government monopolies.
Some of the nontariff barriers influence the volume and pattern of
trade by directly affecting relative costs and prices as in the case of
import sur-charges, while some others work through quantitative limitations
as in the case of quotas. Certain measures are highly variable over time
or dependent upon the discretion of the authorities concerned, and some of
them are applied in a clandestine manner. Anyway, lacking in the informa-
tion about their specific administration is a common phenomenon. Thus,
uncertainties arise from such measures bearing additionally on importers
and foreign exporters tend to reinforce the primary effects of the non-
tariff obstacles themselves.
Moreover, Ingo Walter showed that nontariff barriers may actually
impose an extraordinary burden on the developing countries. This is
because the impact of nontariff obstacles on the developing countries tend
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to be more severe than that on the competing developed countries, and these
measures usually fall on products which are of competitive advantage to
the former in the international market. He found that at least 17 out of
the 38 types of more or less identifiable nontariff barriers are biased
against the developing-country suppliers.1
The first attempt to outlaw the use of quantitative import restric-
tions, took place in November, 1927 when 29 countries signed the Interna-
tional Convention for the Aboliton of Import and Export Prohibition and
Restrictions. But this effected for only a brief period. The second
attempt was undertaken by GATT in 1947. Quantitative restrictions are
considered as improper means of regulating trade flows because they cannot
be operated on a nondiscriminatory basis. Being stated in Article XI of
the General Agreement, quantitative restrictions are prohibited except in
cases of difficulties encountered in the balance of payments and agricul-
tural support programmes. Based on these exceptions, quantitative
restrictions were legitimized by GATT. It whould be noted that owing to
these escape mechanisms, the practical benefits derived from the GATT
provisions in respect of the abolition of quantitative restrictions are
greatly reduced.
4.1 QUOTA RESTRICTIONS
Among the nontariff barriers, quantitative restrictions are the most
widely-used and easily identified ones which frequently take the form of
quotas. Quota restrictions on imports are generally of two types: absolute
quotas and tariff quotas. Absolute quotas are those which impose a maximum
l See Nontariff Barriers and the Export Performance of Developing
Economies by Ingo Walter, American Economic Review, Vol LXI (May 1971),
pp. 195-205.
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limit on the value or quantity of goods which may be imported in a specific
period (usually one year). Tariff quotas establish no maximum on the total
amount of imports provided that a specified quantity of imports may enter
free of duty or at a lower rate of duty during a given period and that all
imports in excess of that quantity will pay the usual, higher rate.2
Besides, quotas are also classified according to whether they are
allocated or unallocated. The unallocated quota, sometimes called the
global quota, specifies a stated quantity of permitted imports for a given
period of time regardless of the origin of those imports.
The major shortcoming of the global quota system is that it tends to
satiate the market at one time and starve it at another. For quota-receiving
countries will seek to obtain greater portions of the quota by exporting as
much as they can to the importing country early in the quota period. Hence,
towards the end of the quota period, shortages of the product will unavoi-
dably occur. This will cause sharp fluctuations in the price of the pro-
duct on the local market. Further, the system may in fact discriminate
against the suppliers of those countries which are relatively far from the
market as neighbouring countries are able to move larger quantities of
their goods into the quota country before more distant countries can even
start to deliver.
To remedy these shortcomings, the allocated quota or country quota is
used. The importing country first specifies the total amount of goods
which may be imported and then allocates portions of that quota to various
exporting countries. Although this system remedies the defects of the
2 Many of the quotas granted by EEC to the developing countries are
tariff quotas.
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global quota system, it tends to freeze the market position of exporting
countries. It makes little room for new suppliers or those who have
improved their productive efficiency and hence able to export more. This
effect is particularly important to the developing countries which seek
outlets for their newly established manufacturing industries because they
are either new competitors, or competitors who have improved the efficiency
of their infant industries. Of course, this problem can be dealt with by
periodic reallocation of quotas among exporting countries.
During the earlier postwar years, quota restrictions were mainly used
to safeguard the external financial position. Many internationally traded
goods such as coal, petroleum and certain agricultural products are subject
to quota restrictions for other reasons. However they can hardly compare
with those on textiles in respect of product coverage and complexity. Much
worth to worry is that the trend of quota restrictions tend to spread into
other areas of trade in manufactures. The allegation for the increasing
use of imports in more recent years is quite different from that of earlier
years where balance of payments problems accounted principally for the use
of quotas. Instead, it is because the developing countries' exports of
manufactures, especially textiles, have undergone rapid growth which, the
developed countries considered, have caused disruption in their local
markets. Therefore, severity of the quota restrictions on textiles grows
with the increase of the developing countries' efficiency in producing and
exporting these products. This proliferating use of quota restrictions
reflects the increase in competitive advantage of the developing countries
in these products. As more and more of the developing economies become
able to sell their commodities over the tariff barriers errected by the
developed countries, quota restrictions instituted by the latter have
become more significant barriers to exports from the former than tariffs.
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Form the standpoint of the importing country, quotas are of course
preferable to tariffs. For once a quota is imposed, a certain market
share can be reserved for the local producers regardless of the improve-
ments in productive efficiency achieved by foreign suppliers. In
addition, tariff concessions influence a vast range of products and their
effects on certain products will inevitably be more substantial than on
others, so that domestic producers of these products will be affected
more. But withdrawal of tariff reductions will be improper as it con-
travenes the spirit of tariff liberalization. In this case, quota restric-
tions may be applied to those products which after tariff cuts are more
vulnerable to foreign competition. These explain why the developed
countries grant tariff concessions on the one hand, and proliferate the
use of quota restrictions on the other.
But to the exporting countries, quotas frustrate their endeavour to
export expansion. Quotas will not confer advantages on those efficient
foreign producers against others. In the case of tariffs, efficient pro-
ducers can sell over these barriers in confrontation with a quota, they
can do nothing except hoping to make the best out of it through negotiations.
To many of the developing countries, the most important quantitative
restrictions existing today are quotas imposed by the developed countries
on their exports of textiles. These can be traced back to the time when
Japan sought full membership in GATT. Many of the Contracting Parties
were afraid that cheap Japanese goods would flood their markets if Japan
were accorded full membership in GATT.3 But quantitative restrictions
Although tariff rates on cotton textiles in the major Western




were not permissible under the GATT provisions apart from the two mentioned
exceptions. Consequently, Japan voluntarily agreed with several of the
Contracting Parties to restrict exports of cotton textiles. In fact, apart
from Japan, the developed countries worried about future exports from
their developing trade partners.
As a result, at the initiative of the United States, GATT adopted
another, exception- entitled market disruption, according to which
quantitative restrictions might be applied. Thus following the Japanese
case, similar arrangements were worked out by the United Kingdom in respect
of cotton textile exports from Hong Kong, India and Pakistan in the late
1950s. Later, similar arrangements were concluded between almost all
advanced countries and a number of the developing countries. These arrange-
ments have been renewed and product coverage extended repeatedly over the
years until eventually all sorts of textile products, including clothing,
are brought under a systematic scheme of quotas.
The imposition of quota usually takes place step by step. When con-
trol on certain imports is needed, the importing country may first advise
the exporting country to undertake some sort of export authorization so
as to keep a close watch on the development. Sometimes certain negotiable
amounts are worked out as signposts for further action. If further control
on imports is necessary, the importing country may request its foreign
supplier to restrain its exports voluntarily, or directly impose quotas on
relevant products.
In many cases, the exporting country is willing to undertake
voluntary restraint prior to direct imposition of the quotas by the
importing country, as by moving unilaterally towards self-restraint it
may have a better chance to retain its existing market share. This is
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very important for those who have already occupied sizeable portions in
the market. Besides, the exporting country fears that if it does not
agree to the proposal of voluntary restraint, ,the alternative would be
a direct imposition of import quotas on their exports.
4.2 HONG KONG'S EXPERIENCE WITH QUOTA RESTRICTIONS
Prior to the late 1950s, Hong Kong's textile products had free access
to the British market, and under the umbrella of the Commonwealth Prefe-
rence the products were allowed duty-free entrance. During the period
1953 to 1958, Hong Kong's exports of cotton textiles had experienced rapid
growth in the United Kingdom as her market share of greycloth in Britain
had shot from 1% to 34%.4 But the good time signalled red light in 1956
when Hong Kong began to feel heavy pressures from the United Kingdom for
the restriction of her exports of cotton piecegoods. During that year, a
heated campaign which culminated in June of the same year was mounted by
Lancashire in protest against the flooding of cheap cotton textiles from
Hong Kong, India and Pakistan.
Consequently, an agreement was worked out between Hong Kong and the
United Kingdom to restrict Hong Kong piecegoods exports to the British
market. This was the so-called Lancashire Pact which entered into force
on February 1,1959, requiring Hong Kong to restrain her exports of cotton
garments and piecegoods to 164 million square yards annually for a period
of three years. This arrangement has been extended with revisions in
certain details a few times until 1972. Annual increment for the total
quota limit was permitted, but product groups under restraint were re-
Hong Kong Textile Annual 1961, p. 77.
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classified into finer categorization with some of the items subject to
separate sub-quotas. Usually, quota for those items in the supersensitive
and. sensitive lists were more difficult in obtaining upward adjustments.
No restriction was imposed on non-sensitive goods but if they reached a
certain level they would be regarded sensitive and subject to restriction
in the following year. Within limited extent, swing between product
groups was permissible. Other flexibility features included carry-over
of the unused quota into the following year and some allowance for over-
fulfilment of an annual quota provided that next year's quota would have
to be curtailed by the same amount.
In 1972, an arrangement was worked out for Hong Kong to limit her
exports of woven cotton and polyester/cotton fabrics, garments and made-
ups to Britain for a period of 15 months from October of the same year.
Doubtlessly, this arrangement has gone beyond the scope of cotton textiles
which had originally been concluded in the Lancashire Pact. Upon its
expiration at the end of 1973, the arrangement was immediately replaced by
a new agreement concluded between Hong Kong and the enlarged EEC (nine)
covering cotton, wool and man-made fibre textiles due to the Britain's
entry into the EEC.
No sooner had the United Kingdom negotiations been settled in the late
1950s, attention was turned to the discussions proposed by the United States
held under GATT on the problems of sharp increases in imports, over a brief
period of time in a narrow range of commodities which) can have serious
5
economic, political and social repercussions in the importing countries.
5 Gilbert P. Verbit, Trade Agreements for Developing Countries,
(Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 58.
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All these were attributable to the fear of causing market disruption
in the developed countries by the inflow of low-priced Japanese cotton
textiles, and the worry about future exports from the developing countries
that might soon begin to disrupt their markets with a variety of products.
Thus under the United States proposal, a Short-Term Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA) was first reached for 1961-
1962 as an interim arrangement for the five years Long-Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) which became
effective from October 1962 to September 1967. According to the arrange-
ments, the importing countries were offered authority to request the
exporting countries to restrain their exports of cotton textiles.6 Upon
its expiration, the Long-Term Arrangement was replaced by a new Arrange-
ment Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (CTA) for three
years, which was later renewed in 1970 for another three years until 1973.
By this time, product coverage had already been extended to include those
non-cotton textiles. By 1974, a new Multi-Fibre Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles (MFA) was concluded which, covering all
sorts of textile products, was effective from 1974 to the end of 1977.
All these arrangements, established under the auspices of GATT, have pro-
vided groundwork for the importing and exporting countries to tackle the
problems arising from textile trade. It was under this general framework
The Arrangement defines cotton textiles to include yarns, fabrics,
made-up articles, garments, and other textile manufactured products, in
which cotton represents more than 50% (by weight) of the fibre content.
But in 1967, the United States adopted a dual criteria which specified
that piecegoods, made-ups and garments shall be judged to be cotton where
either the chief weight or the chief value of the fibre content is cotton.
Report by L.C. Chung in Asian Textile Survey, printed by Far Eastern
Economic Review, (Hong Kong, 1970), p. 88.
81
that Hong Kong entered into various bilateral agreements with individual
developed countries, notably the United States, the EEC countries,
Australia, Canada and Sweden.7 It should be noted that the Hong Kong-
United Kingdom undertaking was not within the domain of GATT.
The various agreements made between Hong Kong and the developed
countries varied a lot in respect of complexity and administration. But
all of them tend to become more and more severe. For instance, under the
STA between Hong Kong and the United States, 30 categories of cotton
textiles were put under restraint. But this later extended to 37 categories
and finally all cotton textiles under the LTA. In 1972, the Hong Kong-
United States Man-made Fibre Wool Textile Agreement came into effect for a
period of five years for Hong Kong to exercise voluntary restraint over her
exports of man-made fibre and wool textiles. The agreement was later re-
placed by a new arrangement under the MFA covering all textiles. Annual
growth rate for.quota ranged from 1% to 5% depending on categories. Other
flexibility features included swing and carryover. In the mean time,
sub-quotas were imposed on specific groups and categories, and it was not
allowed to swing into sensitive categories. Thus the allowance for
swing would be limited as products became more detailly categorized.
This had made Hong Kong become more difficult in fulfilling her quota
because of the growing rigidity of the system. In fact, same difficulties
had been encountered in Hong Kong's agreements-with other countries.
7Agreements were made with individual member states of the EEC
before 1971, .but with all the member countries together since that year.
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4.3 HONG KONG'S POLICY REGARDING INTERNAL QUOTA ALLOCATION
In an attempt to maximize utilization of the quota, Hong Kong has
developed a mechanism for allocating the quota to local exporters. The
administration of quota allocation is in the hands of the Department of
Commerce and Industry, from which permits for the exports of products
subject to specific quotas must be obtained. Others not bound by specific
quotas also require export authorization from the Department in order that
they can remain under control and avoid exceeding the basket limit.8
Quotas are basically allocated according to past performance with
some flexibility measures, which aim to give larger quotas to those pro-
ducers who have demonstrated better ability of utilizing the quotas
available to them.
At the beginning of a quota-year, quotas are allocated according to
the exporters' actual shipments in the previous year. Those who have
shipped 95% or more of the quotas apportioned in the preceding year will
be allocated with the same amount in addition to a certain percentage
growth depending on the total amount of quotas available. Those who have
utilized between 50% and 95% of the quotas assigned in the former year
will be given quotas equal to their actual shipment in that year. On the
other hand, exporters who have used less than 5090 will receive no alloca-
tion at all.
After allocation has been finalized, exporters can apply for quotas
0 Within a group of products subject to quota, there are categories
which have specific sub-quotas while others have not. The basket is
comprised of those which are not subject to specific sub-quotas. However,
the combined exports of these categories cannot exceed the difference
between the group quota and the sum of specific sub-quotas within that
group.
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left unallocated under a Free Quota Scheme on basis of first come first
served. But quotas obtained under this Scheme are not allowed for
transfer and holders will be penalized if the quotas are not used within a
specified period. However, performance against these quotas will be eli-
gible for allocation in the following year. Any further left-over will
be allocated under the Year-End Special Shipment Scheme. A High Hong Kong
Cost Content Scheme was introduced in 1962 to provide special allocation
for cotton textiles destinated to Britain with high Hong Kong content.
Notwithstanding that all these measures are arranged to allow actual
users a better chance of acquiring larger quota allocation, they tend to
benefit the large and well-established firms more and biased against the
new comers. Another disadvantage of allocation by past performance arises
from the fact that performance against quotas of different categories may
vary yearly and there are also seasonal fluctuations in the exports of
different items. Therefore, exporters may sometimes find themselves
holding too much quotas in some items but inadequate in others.
Thus, in order to achieve better utilization, transfer of quotas are
permitted after allocation has been finalized. Under these circumstances,
an open market for quota transferance has come into existence with the
price determined on demand and supply conditions. Transfers are of perma-
nent and temporary types. Quotas of permanent transfer type are qualified
for allocation in the succeeding year, while those of the temporary type
are not.
But this devise of quota transfer has been accused of becoming a
matter of speculation, for some of the exporters tend to seek profits simply
by selling and purchasing quotas. This causes the quota prices sometimes
become unreasonably high, even allegedly as high as 100% of the cost of
84
production for certain hot garment items. Nevertheless, transfer is
still an efficient way to maximize quota utilization. Since exporters
will not purchase quotas from the free market if they cannot bear the cost
of transfer price, this may automatically channel quotas to the more
efficient producers. Meanwhile, those exporters who attempt to make pro-
fit by speculating in the quota market cannot go very far as out-transfers
will cause future reductions in their quota allocations. Recently, a
Surrender Scheme has come into effect aiming to prevent wasting of unused
quotas arising from unnecessary holding. Under the Scheme, holders can
surrender their unutilized quotas to the Department of Commerce and
Industry in return of less reductions in future allocations than in the
case of out-transfers or wastes.
Besides, other flexibility provisions are also offered in line with
agreements between Hong Kong and the importing countries. For example,
exporters can swing a certain percentage or an absolute amount of their
quota holdings from specific categories to basket categories. But the
reverse cannot be done as products categorized in the specific list are
usually hot items subject to specific limits. It should be noted that
swing does not affect the qualification for future allocation. Apart
from that, an exporting firm can over-fill its present quota to a certain
limit in return for reduction in its allocation of the following year.
But carryover of unused quotas to the succeeding year is not allowed in
order to prevent hoarding of quotas that can be used by others.
4.4 PERFORMANCE AGAINST QUOTAS
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Table 4.1 Performance Against Restraints under
GATT Cotton Textiles Arrangements
(as percentage of restraint limit)
61/62 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69Country Coverage
.U.S.A.
30 categories 105.9 98.3
36 categories 96.9
37 categories 99.5
108.2 94.3 102. 2 100.4All cotton textiles
F.R. GERMANY
88.3 89.3 100.0woven nightwear
93.6 98.7 100.97 groups
BENELUX







83.65 groups of garments
NORWAY
99.8 94.2 98.9 loo. o 100.0 97.3woven nightwear
woven sport and












70.8 39.8 43.85 specific categories
84.8Towels
Source: Calculated from data given in Annual Reports of the Department of
Commerce and Industry.
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Table 4.2 Performance Against Quotas under the
British Cotton Textiles Agreement
(as percentage of restraint limit)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968Description













Source: Calculated from data given in Annual Reports of the Department
of Commerce and Industry
* A supplementary quota was included.
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From Table 4.1 above, we can see that Hong Kong's performance against
restraint on cotton textiles under the GATT arrangements has been remarkably
satisfactory for most of the categories during the 1960s. And in the early
1970s, performance in the British and American markets was still well over
90%. However, performance has become poorer in the recent years. Several
factors can accounted for this deterioration. In the first place, product
coverage of the restraint programme has been extended repeatedly over the
years. If the coverage only includes those products which are considered
hot items for which demand in the importing countries is buoyant, the
quotas will most probably be utilized to the full limit. But as coverage
has been extended to embrace those goods for which demand is relatively
sluggish, the extent to which the overall quota can be utilized will, of
course, be lowered.
Secondly, the categorization of product groups has become more detailed
with more products listed as hot items subject to specific sub-quotas.
Quotas of these items are the most probably to be fully utilized. On the
other hand, there are categories with unused quotas. The limitation of
swinging these unused quotas into specific categories prevents the maximi-
zation of utilizing the overall quota. Therefore, the finer the categoriza-
tion of products and the more concentrated the demand for specific
categories, the more difficult it will be in utilizing the overall quota
to the full limit.
Finally, performance against quota restraints depend on the demand of
importing countries for Hong Kong exports and the competitiveness of Hong
Kong products comparing to that of her rivals. If demand for the restrained
items in which Hong Kong has a competitive advantage is buoyant performance
against these categories will be high.
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As in the case of the Hong Kong- United States bilateral agreements,
product coverage had been extended from 37 categories in the early 1960s
to all cotton textiles in the mid-1960s. Later it was extended further to
include all textiles in 1971/72. Concomitantly, categorization of products
has become more detailed with limited allowance for “swing”. As can be
seen from Table 4.3 which illustrates Hong Kong's performance in various
groups and categories in 1973/74 in the United States market, good perfor-
mance tends to concentrate in the specific categories. However, overall
utilization is not quite satisfactory owing to the prohibition of swinging
the unused quotas in the basket categories to the specific ones.
As shown in Table 4.4, similar result can be found in the EEC market
in 1974. Of the 6 specific and 16 basket categories, only the quotas of
the two specific categories, “woven trousers for men and boys” and woven
outergarments for women, girls and infants“ had been fully utilized, and
overall performance was only 86.3%
With a more detailed categorization as in the case of Britain demon-
strated in Table 4.5, performance in 1974 was much worse than those in the
American and EEC markets. Actual shipments of the categories under restric-
tion rarely reached 80% of the restraint limits. Only two specific cate-
gories, namely, sheeting and shirting, 60 ”and over in width“ and “corduroy”
had achieved the levels of 86% and 89.1% respectively. Overall performance
other than cotton yarns was only 68.1%.
4.5 EFFECTS OF QUOTA RESTRICTIONS
In confrontation with tariffs, an exporting country can manage to
alleviate their effects on its exports by reducing production cost or the
profit margin provided that the tariffs are not too high. But in the case
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Table 4.3 Performance Against Quota Restrictions in
the U.S. Market for the Year 1973-74
(as percentage of restraint limit)
Description Performance
1. Textile Yarns Fabrics 80.5
Cotton with
6 specific categories, of which








15 specific categories, of which
Knit shirts and blouses 96.9
113.9Men's and boys' dress shirts
110.7Men's and boys' sport and work shirts
103.1All other coats, not knit
9 basket categories
Man-made Fibre with
9 specific categories, of which 50.0
Knit shirts and blouses 95.7





83.83. Textile Made- ups and Misc. Articles
Cotton with







4. Corduroy Used in Cotton Apparel with 65.6
8 basket categories
Source: Calculated from data given in the Department of Commerce and
Industry's Annual Statistical Review 1974-75.
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Table 4.4 Performance Against Quota Restrictions on Cotton Textiles
in the EEC (Six) Market for the Year 1974
(as percentage of restraint limit)
PerformanceDescription
6 Specific Categories:
101.2(1) Woven trousers for men and boys
(2) Woven outergarments for women,
101.2*girls and infants
(3) Woven shirts for men and boys 36.7
48.3(4) Woven undergarments for men and boys





Source: Calculated from data given in the Department of Commerce
and Industry's Annual Statistical Review 1974-75.
* Shipments include "swing" and "carryover".
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Table 4.5
Performance Against Quota Restrictions on Cotton and
Polyester/Cotton Textiles in the British
Market for the Year 1974
(as percentage of restraint limit)
PerformanceDescription
74.11. Yarns (Cotton only) with
1 specific category:
61.2Yarns, folded, grey. or processed
1 basket category
2. Woven fabrics, grey or bleached,
mercerised or not
4 specific categories, of which
Sheeting and shirting, 60 and
86.oover in width
1 basket category
53.73. Other woven fabrics
4 specific. categories, of which
89.1Corduroy
1 basket category
62.24. Made-up articles, etc.
9 specific categories, of which
Woven shirts and bodices, men's
61.4and Boy's
Woven undergarments, women's,
girls' and infants' 76.9
1 basket category
68.1Group 2, 3 & 4 Total
Calculated from data given in the Department of CommerceSource:
and Industry's Annual Statistical Review 1974-75.
* No specific restraint limit for this group, but shipments
are subject to aggregate restraint limit for groups 2, 3
and 4.
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of quotas which aim to exert direct absolute limitation on the quantity
of imports, the exporting country can do nothing except to diversify its
exports into products which are not subject to restriction, or try to
increase the value of exports, which implies the improving of product
quality.
Tables 4.6-8 show the relative importance of Hong Kong's major exports
of manufactures to the world, developed countries and developing countries
respectively. Table 4.7 is particularly relevant as a large part of the
exports are destinated to the developed countries and quota restrictions
are mainly imposed by these countries. As can be seen from Table 4.7, the
relative importance of textile products has dropped substantially from a
share of about one-fifth in the manufacturing exports to the developed
countries in 1960 to less than one-tenth in 1975, even though its value has
increased nearly three-fold during the same period. Similar pattern can
be found in the footwear industry. On the other hand, relatively new
industries such as electrical machinery, watches and clocks etc., particu-
larly the former, which has surpassed textiles as Hong Kong's second largest
exporting industry, has increased more than ten-fold during the same period.
In the meantime, clothing, which like textiles had been subject to severe
restraint, remained relatively stable in export importance.
The significant contrast in performance between the textile and clothing
industry deserves some explanation. By comparing the average growth rates
of textile and clothing exports of the period 1956-1961 and 1962-1970,
Ronald Hsia showed that the growth rate of textiles had declined from 19.3%
to 7.8%, while that of clothing had slightly increased by 1.1%.9 He attri-
9 Ronald Hsia, Hong Kong Textile Exports -- A Case Study of Voluntary
Restraints, in Obstacles to Trade in The Pacific Area, edited by H.E.
English and K.A.J. Hay, (Carleton University, 1972) pp. 167-183.
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Table 4.6 Hong Kong's Exports of Manufactures- Selected Items, 1960-1975
(in percentages)
BriefSITC 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
DescriptionCode
22.0 25.9 19.8 18.8 17.5 18.0 17.2 14.8 13.0 11.3 10.9 10.6 10.6 12.6 12.58 9.8
65 Textile Yarn, Fabrics
etc.
3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8
69 Manufacturers of Metal
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.2
71 Machinery, other than
Electric
1.9 2.8 3.6 4.4 4.6 6.3 8.9 9.4 9.7 10.6 11.0 11.7 13.5 14.1 15.0 12.7
72 Electric Machinery,
Appliances etc.
0.8 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1
831 Travel Goods, Handbags
etc.
40.1 33.4 38.5 40.0 40.1 38.2 38.0 36.7 37.7 38.4 36.9 41.6 41.9 39.8 39.6 45.9
841 Clothing, except fur
4.5 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.2
851 Footwear
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.3 2.9864 Watches Clocks
893 Articles of Artificial
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1Plastic Materials
894 Perambulators, Toys,
4.6 5.3 5.6 6.1 7.4 8.3 8.7 9.1 9.9 9.3 9.5 9.6 9.6 8.9 8.3 7.3Games etc.
1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.3897 Jewellery
0.2 1.6 1.3 3.1 3.9 6.4 7.1 3.9 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.1599940Wigs Hair Products
-959
2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1812 Sanitary, Plumbing
etc. Fixtures
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 i.o861 Scientific, Medical
etc. Instruments
15.9 14.5 12.5 13.1 11.5 10.7 11.0 9.0 8.8 9.2 8.5 7.5Others
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of gong xong.
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Table 4.7 Hong Kong's Exports of Manufactures to Developed Countries-- belectea L 6 C«jo
(in percentages)
BriefSITC
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75DescriptionCode
65 Textile Yarn, Fabrics
21.3 23.4 20.3 18.4 16.0 16.4 15.4 13.4 11.8 9.8 9.1 9.4- 9.0 10.2 10.1 8.3etc.
1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.269 Manufactures of Metal
70 Machinery, other than
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.9Electric
72 Electric Machinery,
1.2 2.1 3.0 3.9 4.5 6.8 9.8 lo. o lo. 4 11.3 11.4 11.8 13.8 14.2 15.3 12.7Appliances etc.
831 Travel Goods, Handbags
0.5 0.5 0.9 0.6 o.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.0- 2.2 2.0 2.0etc.
46.5 38.9 43.0 44.4 44.0 41.5 41.2 39.4 40.3 40.7 39.2 44.7 45.0 43.6 43.9 50.1841 Clothing, Except fur
4.8 4.4 4.5 4.2 4.3 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.2851 Footwear
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.1864 Watches Clocks
893 Articles of Artificial
0.3 o.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 o.4 o.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0Plastic Materials
894 Perambulators, Toys,
6.0 7.3 7.0 7.6 9.0 9.7 10.1 l0.5 11.6 l0.4 l0.6 l0.6 10.6 10.0 9.5 8.1Games etc.
1.4 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.0987 Jewellery
0.3 1.9 1.6 3.8 4.7 7.6 8.4 4.5 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.2899940-Wigs Hair Products
959
812 Sanitary, Plumbing
1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7etc. Fixtures
861 Scientific, Medical
0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.0etc. Instruments
15.3 13.9 11.4 12.1 10.0 9.7 10.1 7.7 8.4 8.7 7.3 6.5Others
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
95
Table 4.8 Hong Kong's Exports of Manufactures to Developing countries-Selectea ltems, 1960-1975
(in percentages)
SITC Brief
6o 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Code Description
65 Textile Yarn, Fabrics
23.4 30.4 18.7 19.8 22.7 24.3 24.7 20.9 18.8 19.2 20.3 18.1 20.7 25.7 23.8 16.7
etc.
10.0 9.7 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.0 6.5 6.4 5.6 5.5 5.6
69 Manufactures of Metal
71 Machinery, other than
1.3 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.7 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6Electric
72 Electrical Machinery,
3.3 4.1 4.9 5.8 4.9 4.6 5.2 6.6 6.5 7.1 9.0 11.4 11.6 13.4 14.0 12.6Appliances etc.
831 Travel goods, handbags
1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.5
etc.
26.3 23.7 27.3 27.8 27.0 25.5 25.1 25.0 25.4 25.8 24.9 23.5 23.4 18.4 18.7 24.4841 Clothing, except fur
3.9 3.3 3.9 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.7 0.9 1.0 1.1851 Footwear
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.7 2.4 3.0 3.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.5 7.3864 Watches Clocks
893 Articles of Artificial
1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6Plastic Materials
894 Perambulators, Toys,
1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.2 3.2 1.6 3.7 3.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 2.8 3.3Games etc.
1.7 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.7 4.0897 Jewellery
812 Sanitary, Plumbing
5.0 4.7 4.1 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.6etc. Fixtures
861 Scientific, Medical
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9etc. Instruments
18.7 17.3 17.0 17.3 18.9 16.2 15.9 13.9 12.2 12.3 12.8 12.8Others
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
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Table 4.9 Shares of Textiles and Clothing in Hong Kong
Export of Manufactures to Selected Markets
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Market
United States
11.9 15.0 11.8 12.3 9.3 8.2 10.6 8.0 7.3 5.9 5.0 5.6 5.9 6.5 6.6 5.1textiles
52.5 39.1 41.5 37.8 36.1 37.1 33.5 33.1 35.4 34.2 32.2 28.1 35.4 33.6 33.5 43.4
clothing
United Kingdom
34.1 34.5 31.6 23.6 21.2 29.0 25.3 22.7 20.6 18.8 17.9 18.8 16.7 13.9 16.2 14.8textiles
36.4 33.8 40.0 47.2 46.7 39.3 41.7 41.5 42.7 44.5 43.7 49.5 50.6 51.1 49.5 57.5clothing
EEC- Six
9.3 12.4 5.1 8.7 7.5 6.7 5.4 4.4 3.2 2.0 4.1 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.6 2.6textiles
65.6 59.0 67.1 69.1 69.4 68.4 67.4 60.9 59.5 60.5 56.9 62.9 66.8 64.2 63.5 61.0
clothing
Australia
35.9 36.4 41.5 44.1 47.5 47.0 44.6 43.4 39.4 36.7 34.6 34.0 32.1 39.6 28.5 29.1textiles
21.4 15.6 12.7 14.5 13.5 14.4 16.2 18.6 19.5 19.6 20.2 24.0 26.5 24.1 32.7 30.4clothing
Canada
1.7 4.9 7.6 12.3 14.7 12.3 14.3 11.3 7.5 5.5 5.3 4.6 5.3 4.5 5.3 6.2textiles
62.7 51.2 47.5 40.4 38.8 38.4 40.6 45.0 48.9 50.2 44.1 48.1 48.8 45.4 42.1 53.4clothing
Japan
9.3 4.4 2.2 1.1 2.7 1.3 2.9 1.0 1.7 1.6 9.2 4.6 4.7 18.6 3.4 3.5textiles
27.8 4.4 6.1 7.6 5.8 7.4 6.2 11.0 22.7 23.2 32.0 39.3 31.1 33.0 42.4 34.0clothing
Source: Calculated from the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
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buted this to the difficulties encountered by textile producers in shifting
into other products. For instance, the shifting from the production of
cotton yarn and fabrics to synthetic yarn and fabrics will inevitably incur
substantial re-investment on the part of the spinners and weavers as the
machinery and equipment used in producing the cotton goods are unsuitable
for synthetic products. In the garment sector, the serving machinery and
equipment are still usable for the processing of synthetic products after
minor modifications. In other words, product diversification is more fea-
sible in the clothing sector.
Furthermore, the textile industry in Hong Kong is relatively more
capital-intensive and centres on mass-production of comparatively
homogeneous products which need a longer period of turnover. These cause
the textile export become more difficult to cater for market requirements
in the short run and vulnerable to world competition. On the other hand,
the garment sector relies comparatively more on skilled and semi-skilled
labour (for which Hong Kong has no lack of), and has a wider range of
products to diversify. These enable the manufacturers to react to changing
market conditions rapidly by switching between markets and products. In
addition, clothing industry in Hong Kong has been moving in the direction
of producing high-quality fashions which depends much on skilled labour
and not so much as textile on the economy of scale. To sum up, the clothing
industry is more feasible in coping with the changing demand conditions by
improving the product quality and differentiating within a considerable
range of products within a relatively shorter period of time. Thus, Hong
Kong has been able to sustain a rather steady growth in her exports of
garment despite of the quantitative restrictions prevailing in the trade
of these products. Clothing is by far the leading item in the export
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basket of Hong Kong dominating about half of her export sources. By the
year 1971 Hong Kong has overtaken Japan as the largest supplier in
clothing accounting for 23.3% of the total United States garment imports
in 1975. In the British market, the share amounted to 32.6%. In the
Federal Republic of Germany, Hong Kong has surpassed France as the-second
largest supplier (Italy being the first) occupying 13.8% of the country's
clothing imports during the same year, 10
From the quantum indices shown in Table 4.10, we can see how textile
fabrics, textile made-ups and footwear have been affected by quantitative
restrictions, especially the latter two whose quantum indices have shown
a continuous downward trend in the recent years. In contrast with' this,
transistorized radios, electronics components, watches and clocks showed
significant increases in quantity. These are relatively new industries
which Hong Kong has diversified into over the past several years. And
indeed, Hong Kong has the potential to keep heading towards this direction
considering the ability of adjusting herself to changing conditions over
the years.
Although being blurred by the recent trend of price inflation, we can
still recognize the relatively faster increases in the unit value indices
(as shown in Table 4.10) of those products which are being placed under
quantitative control, showing that these goods have been shifting to pro-
ducts of higher processing and sophistication. It is conceived that
watches and clocks industry has begun to move along this route since the
mid-1970s.
10 Hong Kong Review of Overseas Trade 1975.
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Table 4.10 Export Unit Value and Quantum Indices
of Selected Manufactures, 1968-75
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The success in tariff reduction over the past three decades had
eliminated, to a large extent, tariff barriers but entailed increasing
attention on nontariff measures as the major obstruction to international
trade. As being stated by Patterson, the lowering of tariffs has, in
effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level has revealed
all the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be
cleared away ".ll Nontariff barriers take a variety of forms, but
the most important and readily identified one is import quota.
Hong Kong had the experience of quota restrictions for nearly twenty
years dating back to the late 1950s, when a Hong Kong- United Kingdom
agreement on the restriction of Hong Kong's cotton textile exports to the
British market was reached. Later, on basis of the GATT Long-Term Arrange-
ment, Hong Kong entered into various bilateral agreements with all her
major textiles buyers. And now virtually all her textile and clothing
exports are under restraint.
The effect of import quotas on textiles can be readily recognized by
the drastic decline in export importance of this industry. However,
clothing has hardly been affected owing to its capability of moving into
the production of more sophisticated goods and differentiating within a
considerable range of products. Meanwhile, in an attempt to alleviate the
overall effect of quantitative restrictions on her exports, Hong Kong tends
to diversify her export basket into new product lines such as electrical
machinery, toys, watches and clocks.
11 See Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade The
Policy Issues, 1945-1965, (Princeton University Press, 1966).
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In addition to the recession, the unsatisfactory performance against
quotas in the recent years was due to finer categorization of items under
restraint which resulted in large amount of unused quotas in some categories.
Further, the move towards a more even burden-sharing among the EEC member
states regarding import quotas also limits the maximization of quota
utilization as certain markets such as France and Italy do not open up as
fast as Hong Kong would wish. Nevertheless, there is still considerable
room for Hong Kong exports to achieve further expansion provided that local
manufacturers are flexible enough to be alert to cope with market conditions
and remain competitive. But the real danger is the growing tendency of some
countries to substitute the Voluntary Restraint schemes with unilateral
Global Quota schemes.
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Chapter 5 TRADE PROMOTION
With practically no natural, resources to speak of, the Hong Kong
economy relies to a great extent on its export earnings: nearly 90% of
Hong Kong's products are sold beyond her frontiers. Indeed, it is due
to the dependence on exports and keen competition in the world market
that Hong Kong has to pay special attention to sales promotion abroad.
Circumscribed by her size and special economic environment, a significant
portion of Hong Kong's export is confined to a limited range of labour-
intensive manufactures. But in order to take advantage of concrete trade
opportunities and be responsive to market conditions, constant changes
within this range are necessary if sustained growth for export trade is
needed. Hence, Hong Kong has to suit her products to market requirements
on the one hand, and make them known to potential clients on the other.
In fact, Hong Kong spares no effort to undertake whatever can help to
maintain present markets and create new ones. Needless to say, her well-
developed transportation, communication and financial structures facilitate
the implementation of this work very much.
This Chapter attempts to give a delineation of the trade, promotion
techniques that Hong Kong employed, and summarizes the work done over the
years. Although the history of trade promotion undertaken by Hong Kong
could be traced back to the early 1950s, it was not systematic and in a
significant scale until the establishment of the Hong Kong Trade Development
Council in 1966. Before the appearance of the Trade Development Council,
trade promotional work was chiefly carried out separately by private or-
ganizations under the direction of the Department of Commerce and Industry.
When the Council came into existence, it took full responsibility for the
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implementation of this work.
5.1 TRADE PROMOTION UNDERTAKEN BY HONG KONG BEFORE 1966
The need for trade promotion was not aware until 1952 when the
Government laid the cornerstone to this work by setting up a Promotion
Office under-the Economic Division of the Department of Commerce and
Industry. But progress made by the Office during its first year of
existence was limited due to the work burden caused by a considerable
range of trade matters. In view of the vital necessity of specialization
and to solve difficulties arising from expanding activities, the Depart-
ment was reorganized in 1953. It was due to this reorganization that
gave rise to four independent divisions, one of which was the Trade
Development Division with trade promotion as its main concern. Under
the advice of the Trade And Industry Advisory Board,1 trade promotional
activities undertaken by the Division usually concentrated on the parti-
cipation of a trade fair or sending out a trade mission in each spring
and autumn. From 1955 to 1965, the Department had organized activities
in six continents embracing 26 trade fairs and displays while trade mis-
sions had a coverage of 40 countries which comprised the main outlets of
Hong Kong's exports. The Department's overseas offices in London, Sydney
and Brussels also provided the machinery for the promotion of foreign
trade. Nevertheless. promotional work was not carried out to a significant
1 The Board, appointed on 1 January, 1959 to replace the Trade And
Industry Advisory Committee, is composed of nine members chaired by the
Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry. Its terms of re-
ference is: 'To advise the Director of the Department of Commerce and
Industry on all matters other than labour which affect Hong Kong's trade
and industry'. 1959/60 Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and
Industry,. (Hong Kong, 196o), p. 13.
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scale until the existence of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council.
The success of trade promotion depends upon the combined efforts of
the government and the private sector. For the government having paved
the way for a favourable business climate, it was the private business-
man's concern to promote the specific product he intended to sell. In
fact, the private businessman should be more concerned in trade promotion
than anybody else, because he stood to benefit from it.
Before the Hong Kong Government was urged to launch promotional
activities, initial steps had been taken by the Chinese Manufacturers'
Association and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, both of which
had representational status in the industrial and commercial community in
Hong Kong. The Chinese Manufacturers' Association was the pioneer in
promotional work as it initiated Hong Kong's first venture into inter-
national fairs by participating in the first postwar British Industries
Fair (1948). It also organized sales promotion tours for its members in
South East Asia, Australia and the United States. Notwithstanding the
improvement attained by the Association on the prestige value of Hong Kong
products abroad, to arouse local interest in domestic products seemed also
to be its major concern as a great deal of its energy was employed in
mounting an annual exhibition of Hong Kong products locally.
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce embarked on trade promo-
tional activities ever since its Secretary attended an E.C.A.F.E. Trade
Promotion Conference in Singapore 1951. In addition, representatives of
the Chamber had attended a large number of such meetings and those con-
cerned with international trade. Organized by the Chamber in 1954, Hong
Kong participated in the Washington State International Trade Fair in
Seattle which was her first venture in-a trade fair outside the United
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Kingdom. In 1956., 1957, 1959 and 1960, Hong Kong had official displays
at several European Fairs. In each case, the Chamber played an important
role by providing a leader or other members for the delegation from its
General Committee or permanent staff. Apart from this, in conjunction
with a British company it helped in the preparation of a television film
'Hong Kong Today' and in the production of several pamphlets 'The Pattern
of Trade', 'A Comparision of People', 'The First Half'-,and 'Hong Kong
and its Textile Industry' (which was produced during the negotiations
with the Cotton Advisory Board2 in 1958). All these endeavoured to re-
flect the economic and non-economic aspects of Hong Kong.
The Information Services Department and the Tourist Association
(semi-governmental) functioned in a subsidiary capacity to help generate
promotional activities. The services that the Department rendered
included the preparation and channelization of publicity material, design
of display features, and provision of film and photographic services.
Regardless of being a service organization, proposals furnished by the
Department in regarding promotion work were often brought under discussion
with other agencies engaged in.this field.
The Tourist Association had its main task on the promotion of Hong
Kong's tourist trade which had long been a great source of income to Hong
Kong. The Association made effort to create a favourable image of Hong
Kong as a vacation resort, and sought to improve facilities for visitors.
2 The Board was appointed on 21 July, 1961 comprising 12 unofficial
members under the chairmanship of the Director of the Department of
Commerce and Industry with the following terms of reference: 'Arising out
of the exceptional issues which the cotton industry in Hong Kong faces,
to advise Government-on any matter which directly affects the cotton
industry in Hong Kong'. 1961/62 Annual Report-of the Department of
Commerce and Industry, (Hong Kong, 1992), p. 12.
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It maintained close co-ordination for the activities of those engaged in
the tourist trade. Co-operations with the Department of Commerce and
Industry and the Information Services Department to participate in
selected trade and travel fairs and exhibitions were quite often. Through
a local airline, it maintained a network of representation in several
cities in Australia, Britian, and United States and Japan.
Before 1962, private agencies depended on their own resources in
undertaking promotional programmes. Since the Commercial Public Relations
Co-ordinating Committee came into being that year, expenses for this pur-
pose were met by annual subventions equivalent to one half of the estimated
annual yield from stamp duties paid by merchants and manufacturers on
export and import declarations, in addition to a small contribution from
general revenue.3
5.2 SHORTCOMINGS UNDERLYING THIS ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Committee which was appointed for an experimental period of two
years, having the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce and the Federation
of Hong Kong Industries4 represented in the private sector, was composed
of the chairmen and executive heads of the agencies in the trade promotion
field receiving public funds under the chairmanship of the Director of
3 The stamp duty was doubled specifically for this purpose in 1962.
The original imposition was one dollar per declaration in order to cover
the cost of Government statistical services and the extra dollar was
for the above said purpose.
4 The Federation was established in June, 1960 aiming at the pro-
viding of a central organization to act and speak on behalf of all manu-
facturing interests -in Hong Kong. Federation of Hong Kong Industries
Annual Report, 1960.
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Commerce and Industry Department. It maintained several representatives
in Europe, the United States and East Africa. Its task was to ensure
that the public funds at its disposal for programmes submitted by its
member agencies were properly used. Although the Committee served to
co-ordinate and had the right to be informed of the projects undertaken
separately by the various agencies, it had no authority to amend the pro-
grammes. It could only hope to suggest amendment in case of conflict.
Doubtlessly, duplication of effort, hence a waste of resources, was in-
evitable if compromise between the programmes drawn up by the various
agencies could not be attained. Furthermore, misunderstanding and over-
lapping of purpose in connexion with the whole range of trade promotional
activities between overseas representatives of the agencies very often
gave rise to conflicts which caused confusion in the mind of the public
both in Hong Kong and overseas.
Another shortcoming stemmed from the difficulties in co-ordination
between the Chinese Manufactures' Association and other agencies in re-
garding promotional activities as the Association did not participate in
the Committee, because it found no financial support from the Committee
for this purpose. Moreover, separate performance of the agencies in
carrying out their programmes led to the fragmentation of the small cadre
of experienced staff.
The Committee, after a period of two years, admitted the difficulties
it encountered in undertaking its task under the existing organizational
structure in its report in September, 1964 which pointed out-----
'Early on we became acutely aware that commercial
public relation is at best a vague, and at worst a
controversial, term and our discussions have been beset
by difficulties of definition. In practice this has
meant that we have found it difficult to effect
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co-ordination in the fullest sense, let alone ex post
facto evaluation as a committee we tended to confine
ourselves to exchange of information and to try to
agree on a suitable definition.. But we could not.....'
Hence, it recommended that certain procedural changes and alterations
in the Committee's terms of reference had to be made if a greater
measure of co-ordination was hoped.
Recognizing the weaknesses prevailing in the existing framework,
it was conceived that a centralized organization in which representatives
of all agencies interested in trade promotion would pool their available
resources together in undertaking one single co-ordinated programme was
urgently needed. Hence a Working Committee with the majority of whose
members coming from the Commercial Public Relations Co-ordinating Committee
was appointed on 25 March, 1965 with the following terms of reference6
(1) to view the present organizational structure for trade promotion
in the broadest sense with a view to assessing its flexibility
and effectiveness and the need for new measures particularly to
avoid duplication of effort
(2) to examine methods employed by other countries to promote trade
and to suggest what lessons for Hong Kong may be learned from them
(3) to recommend and report by lst January, 1966 whether a new insti-
tutional framework is desirable or essential to provide central
direction and conduct of Hong Kong's export promotion programme
on a continuing basis and, if so, to suggest its composition,
functions, powers and legislative and financial framework.
5 Report of the Working Committee on Export Promotion Organization
1965, P• 5•
6 Report of the Working Committee on Export Promotion Organization
1965 INTRODUCTION, p. v.
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5.3 THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Based on the recommendations of the report submitted by the Working
Committee, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (TDC) came into
existence as a statutory body in September, 1966.7 It is a quasi-
independent body with the primary duty of designing a single programme
which replaces the separate programmes of the existing agencies on export
promotion matters. The legislation incorporating the council contains a
statement of the council's purpose, fields of activity and tasks on the
following lines:8
to assist the development of Hong Kong's overseas trade through:
(1) promotion of Hong Kong exports by
a/ organizing and financing, and assisting with the organization
and financing of, such activities as may seem to the council
beneficial to the export trade of Hong Kong as a whole
b/ establishing means of contact between overseas buyers and
local exporters and manufacturers and
c/ distributing publicity material about Hong Kong products and
(2) creation of a favourable image of Hong Kong as a trading partner and
manufacturing centre by
a/ disseminating general information on Hong Kong's economy and,
in consultation with the Government, encouraging an understanding
of its particular problems
b/ advising the Information Services Department of the need for the
7 The Commercial Public Relations Co-ordinating Committee was allowed
to dissolve on the TDC's inception.
8 Report of the Working Committee on Export Promotion Organization
1965.
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provision of information meterial on matters of general Govern-
ment policy in cases where misunderstanding or lack of information
may be damaging to the favourable image.
Chaired by an independent figure of high standing in the commercial
and industrial community in Hong Kong, the council itself is a policy
making body comprising fourteen members. Seven of them are ex official
members composed of the chairmen*or executive heads of the Hong Kong
General Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, the
Chinese Manufacturers' Association, the Hong Kong Tourist Association,
the Exchange Bank Association, the Department of Commerce and Industry
and the Information Services Department. Three other members are one each
nominated by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Hong
Kong Industries, and Chinese Manufacturers' Association. The rest four
are appointed by the Hong Kong Governor. A vice-chairman is elected by,
and from, the Council. The chairman is regarded additional to the fourteen
members and has a vote only in case of deadlock.
On the other hand, headed by an Executive Director, the day-to-day
work of the TDC is carried out by a secretariat serviced by the staff
previously engaged in trade promotion work in the Department of Commerce
and Industry including that of the Sydney Office and part of that of the
London Office, together with the staff of the local and overseas offices
formerly under the auspices of the Public Relations Co-ordinating Committee.
The Executive Director is responsible for the forward planning and execution
of trade promotion projects, and the establishment of overseas representa-
tion. On the TDC's creation, there were five overseas offices stationed
in London, Sydney, New York, Brussels and Nairobi. The Head Office in
Hong Kong composes of five departments:.Design, Publicity Services, Trade
111
Services, Administration, and Accounts. Pay-listed staff in March 1976
amounted to 290, of which 93 were placed in the overseas offices.9 Accor-
ding to the Council's 1975/76 report, the organization structure of TDC
is shown as the chart on the following page. The Council is financed by
subvention derived from the levy on declarations of imports, exports and
re-exports with a deduction of approximately HK$1 million representing
the original duty introduced-to cover the cost of Government statistical
services. The ad valorem rate is 500 per $1,000 or part thereof, with a
minimum charge of $2 a declaration. 10
In addition to Government subvention, other sources of income include
those from the advertisements on, and sales of publications issued by the
Council, interests received on bank deposits etc. The annual income grew
at increasing rates from HK$12 million in 1966/67 to HK$35 million in
1975/76, except that the growth rate in 1975/76 diminished from 16% in the
previous year to 7% due to the decline in trade caused by the world-wide
economic recession. However, it was of special necessity for the Council
to intensify its promotional activities during these hard times so that
Hong Kong might rapidly take full advantage from a subsequent economic
revival. Hence, it was not surprising that contrary pattern was found
in expenditure, for the growth rate of which had increased from 996 in
1974/75 to 14% in 1975/76.
On the other hand, during the period 1966-1976, the expenditure of
9 Hon Kong Trade Development Council Annual Report 1975/76, (Hong
Kong, 1976), p. 26.
'10 The subvention for the first year of the Council's existence was
equivalent to 0.25% of the value of domestic export or some HK$11.5
million on 1964-65 figures. Report of the Working Committee on Export
Promotion Organization 1965, p. 32.
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TDC had increased from HK$8 million to HK$35 million. Of all the outlays,
staff costs occupied the largest share, accounting for about 40% of the
total expenditure. Those apportioned for the purpose of trade fairs,
missions and exhibitions took another one third. Overall administrative
costs remained in the region of 109.11
5.4 TRADE PROMOTION TECHNIQUES
As emphasized in its terms of reference, the Council does not confine
itself to the task of exploring outlets for current products. It also
seeks to induce foreign investment on Hong Kong's industries. Thus, it
is conceived that the scheme implemented by the Council should be a com-
prehensive one. In the Council's concerns of promoting, assisting and
developing Hong Kong's export trade, its functions fall under the following
broad heads:
(1) to provide trade information both for and about Hong Kong,
(2) to sponsor the sending from Hong Kong, and reception from abroad,
of trade missions for the promotion of exports,
(3) to organize Hong Kong's participation in trade exhibitions held
locally and abroad.
5.4.1 Trade Information
Foreign trade promotion relies to a great extent on the availability
of data and information on markets. Hence, a pool of accurate trade in-
formation is considered an important pre-requisite for a successful trade
expansion programme. The purpose of trade information terminates, in the
11 All figures and percentages are cited and calculated from the
annual reports of TDC. The percentage for administrative costs is only
an approximation estimated by the Council.
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broadest sense, in two ends which aim to provide local manufacturers and
exporters with market intelligence on the one hand, and to introduce
local products to overseas on the other. While the former makes effort
to enable local suppliers to improve the marketability of their products,
the latter seeks to acquaint the importers of those countries with the
goods available in Hong Kong. Thus, both of them. complement each other
in pursuing the target of export expansion.
Publication, film and photograph, and press are often used for
publicity purposes. Among them, publication is usually the initial step.
Trade publicity in Hong Kong comprises:
a/ Regular publications to inform foreign businessmen of Hong Kong indus-
tries and products, trade legislation and a variety of matters on
economic and non-economic aspects, as well as to provide local business
people information about market conditions, trade policies and practices
prevailing abroad. (e.g. the Trade Bulletin)
b/ Regular publications containing details of specific products with
relevant suppliers to inform overseas customers about the characteris-
tics and recent developments of these products. (e.g. the Hong Kong.
Apparel and the Hong Kong Toys)
c/ Regular and occasional publications to inform visiting business people
and those abroad about the investment potential in Hong Kong. (e.g. the
Commerce, Industry And Finance Directory, the Industrial Investment Hong
Kong and the Joint Venture Hong Kong etc.)
d/ Attractive literature produced for use at Hong Kong exhibitions in trade
fairs. It is usually issued in format of pamphlets or brochures with
colourful pictures featuring a considerable range of products available
in Hong Kong.
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The Department of Commerce and Industry was charged with the work of
trade information dissemination in the early 1950s until the mid-1960s
it was taken over by the trade Development Council as an executive organ
for this purpose with collaboration from the Information Services
Department.
Concomitant with the existence of the Trade Promotion Office, in
1952, a monthly publication called the Trade Enquiries Bulletin which was
later adopted a new lay-out to change the name to the Trade Bulletin in
1953 was issued with a circulation of approximately 1,400 copies recorded
.at end of March, 1953- 12 953• The Bulletin contained up-to-date information
on local industries and products, trade statistics, various aspects of
industrial development, trade legislation affecting Hong Kong and other
general trade matters. Its main objective was to introduce new products
to overseas buyers and to publicize Hong Kong's established industries.
Copies sold locally also contained a supplement giving details of trade
enquiries received from overseas. In 1961/62, over 1,300 enquiries were
published in the Bulletin.13
In April 1955, the annual Commerce, Industry and Finance Directory
was issued having an initial circulation of approximately 17,000 copies,
with the majority of which distributed to overseas inquiries. 14 The
Directory provided a considerable range of information constituting
crucial factors for decision making in investment in Hong Kong and main-
12 1952/53 Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry,'
P• 13-
13 1961/62 Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
p. 36,
14 1955/56 Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
p. 13.
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tained a brief description on measures adopted by other countries which
may affect Hong Kong's trade. Both the Bulletin and Directory were
available free on overseas requests but a small subscription was charged
on local demand. The two issues and other promotional publications which
might be issued on requirement were produced by the Trade Publications
Section with the consultation of the Trade And Industry Advisory Board.
In addition to the two regular publications, other occasional issues
like Hong Kong for the Businessman, Joint venture Hong Kong, Opportunity
Hong Kong, Display Centre of Hong Kong Products, A Short Guide to Hong
Kong etc. were published by the Information Services Department during
the early 1960s. Many of these issues were distributed to visiting
businessmen and at trade fairs. But most of them were sent overseas to
consulates, shipping companies, airlines, trade and travel associations
etc. During the year 1962, about 12,000 copies of Hong Kong for the
Businessman along with colour pamphlets featuring some of Hong Kong's
products and industries were sent to these agencies.15 By the year 1971,
this issue was reprinted in English, German, Japanese and Italian, of
which 13,500 copies in English and 16,000 in other languages were ordered
for distribution through overseas offices and at trade fairs.16 By the
year 1969/70, nearly half a million copies of these trade magazines,
brochures, product pamphlets and booklets were issued. The increasing
circulation of these publications over the years along with responding
enquires indicated the productive effect of this work.
15 1962/63 Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
p• 35•
16 TDC Annual Report 1971/72, (Hong Kong, 1972).
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This work was expanded when the TDC took over the responsibility for
the production and dissemination of publicity material. The Trade Bulle-
tin which was originally issued by the Department of Commerce and Industry
and unchanged in format when transferred to the TDC was supersceded in
October, 1967 by the Hong Kong Enterprise. This publication was later
adopted with Japanese, French and German inserts for copies circulated in
the respective countries. And in order to intensify visual commercial
publicity, the Hong Kong Apparel and the Hong Kong Toys were issued in
1969 particularly for the creation of more direct interest in Hong Kong-
made garments and toys. To attract foreign direct investment and promote
joint ventures, the Industrial Investment Hong Kong was produced in con-
junction with the Department of Commerce and Industry in 1971. In addi-
tion, a twenty-minute colour film in English, German and Japanese was
prepared in this field.
Another facet of general information work is the distribution of
departmental press releases. A special Press Section was set up by the
TDC during the year 1967/68. It provides a comprehensive press service
by supplying features and photos to many interested recipients local and
abroad through the Council's overseas offices. To enhance promotion
through print, the Overseas Press Service was founded in February, 1970
responsible for supplying material about Hong Kong and the Council's
activities to offices abroad for placing in overseas press and trade
journals. During the year 1971/72, more than 3,000 overseas press cut-
tings originated by the TDC were returned to the Press Section (about
twice the year before).17 By the year 1974/75, approximately 7,000 press
17 Ibid.
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cuttings of TDC-originated releases were returned from overseas offices
since the commencement of the Press Section, and over a million copies
of trade publications were circulated.18
By the way, the handling of trade enquiries both from local and
overseas businessmen constitutes a significant portion of the TDC's
routine administration. The enquiries are from overseas importers inte-
rested in doing business with Hong Kong and from local business people
seeking export outlets. But the majority of them were received directly
from overseas and through offices stationed abroad. During the year
1967/68, 20,386 enquiries were processed.19 With the expansion of over-
seas offices and their activities, enquiries received through them have
increased quite substantially and there has been a downward shift in the
number of enquiries received directly from abroad. On the other hand,
the Head Office in Hong Kong has started building up a data bank of trade
information since 1967. Market surveys were conducted for the guidance
of trade fair participations and trade missions. Local businessmen were
given assistance before they departed for selling trips abroad. Arrange-
ments were often made for overseas visitors on business missions prior to
their visits to Hong Kong.
Experience has showed that offices stationed abroad are effective
channels for information dissemination. The number of overseas offices
has increased to a significant scale during the past decade. At the time
it took over from the Department of Commerce and Industry, the TDC had
only five overseas offices (in London, Sydney, Brussels, New York and
18 TDC Annual Report 1974-75, p. 18-19.
19 TDC Annual Report 1968-69, p. 15.
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Nairobi.20 Since then trade attaches were posted in important commercial
cities abroad each with the responsibility to promote trade in a certain
country or region.
In 1960, the London Office was the only representative of the Hong
Kong Government overseas with the promotion of trade between Hong Kong
and the European countries as one of its concerns. It has been expanded
continuously with expanding activities and growing staff. Window displays
featuring Hong Kong's achievements were held regularly and in some cases
special groups of Hong Kong products were put on exhibition by the Office.
By the year 1969, due to the reorganization of overseas representation,
it became the headquarter of the European offices and played important
role in trade negotiations between Hong Kong and the European countries.
In 1964,.it had assisted in settling the adverse publicity aroused in
Britain in complaining against the sub-standards of flame proofing of
childen's nightwear and the lead content of plastic toys.
The Sydney Office was established on l December, 1960. During its
inception, the Trade Representative spent most of his time in paying
visits to key cities of Australia and having meetings with Australian
businessmen and Government officials. The most important project under-
taken by the Office during its first year of existence was the organization
of Hong Kong's participation in the Sydney International Trade Fair in
August, 1961. The Fair was considered a successful one having 264 enqui-
ries covering 501 items.
On 1 June, 1965, the Brussels Office came to exist which was planned
to handle trade matters between Hong Kong and the EEC countries. But in
20 The Office, being responsible for the promotion of Hong Kong's
trade in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, was allowed to run down in
August, 1971.
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1969, it was scaled down to cover the Benelux countries only.
In February, 1970, the Frankfurt Office was opened to serve the
Federal Republic of Germany. And.seven other Offices including Vienna,
Chicago, Los Angeles, were set up between 1970 and 1971. Hence by the
year 1975, there were fifteen offices and subsidiary offices stationed
in cities of almost all countries in the world which have substantial
trade with Hong Kong. They were: London, Sydney, New York, Stockholm,
Frankfurt, Vienna, Chicago, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Toronto, Milan, Amsterdam,
Manchester, Hamburg and Zurich.
These Offices devoted most of their time to the promotion of trade
between Hong Kong and the respective countries in which they were sta-
tioned. Their activities include the furnishing of statistical informa-
tion both for and about Hong Kong, supplying of up-to-date material about
Hong Kong to interested recipients, organization of Hong Kong's participa-
tion in trade fairs, offering of assistence to business people who intend
to visit Hong Kong and providing of co-ordination for discussions on
joint venture. In addition, they also provide the machinery for settlement
of trade disputes that may arise between the contracting parties before
the complaints were referred to formal commercial arbitration or legal
action. They furnish the home office with periodical and special reports
on the economic, financial and commercial conditions prevailing abroad.
Market surveys conducted by them were usually undertaken by firms of mar-
ket research consultants sited at the appropriate markets. The Trade
Representatives were always in close liasion with business people and
government officials of the countries in which they were posted in order
to maintain alertness on any change in trade policies and business prac-
tices adopted by these countries which might affect Hong Kong's trade and
121
initiate counter action in appropriate cases. Talks on Hong Kong were
often given by them at public meetings and in some cases aided by film
shows or colour slides.
Though market exploration appears to be the main function of the
overseas offices, the discovering of markets for particular products does
not necessary mean access to those markets for Hong Kong exporters. For
barriers such as preferences, quantity control, labelling and packaging
problems etc. may exist. These restrictions have to be examined and
overcome before entry of the relevant products to those markets is
achieved irrespective of product suitability, price and delivery considera-
tions. The restrictions may be abolished or reduced to a certain extent
by the attaining of Bilateral Trade Agreements through negotiations. The
overseas offices usually participate in those trade talks under the
direction of the Department of Commerce and Industry. However, they
only assist in a subsidiary capacity in handling these matters, for
questions related to trade relations problems are to be decided in the
last resort by the Government.
5.4.2 Trade Exhibitions
International trade fairs and exhibitions are recognized media for
the development of trade and commerce between nations. They provide
opportunities for the publicity of products and on-the-spot sales of goods
and receiving of orders. Through such displays, participants are able to
demonstrate a vast range of products to a large number of potential
buyers as well as to introduce their new products and appoint agents.
The initiation of Hong Kong's participation in overseas trade fairs
could be traced back to the exhibit at the first postwar British Industries
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Fair which was participated by the Chinese Manufacturers' Association in
1948. The Association continued to take a leading'part in participating
these fairs until 1953 the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce took its
place by acting an important role in organizing and providing members of
the delegation in respect of these activities. In 1954, the Chamber
organized Hong Kong's first venture at a trade fair outside the United
Kongdom by organizing Hong Kong's participation in the Washington State
International Trade Fair in Seattle. Following the success of the visit
to Seattle, Hong Kong continued to take part in fairs there in 1956, 1957
and 1960.
This work was enhanced by the TDC when it came into being in 1966 and
became the executive organ for the organization of manufacturers to take
part in world fairs and trade exhibitions. As can be seen from the table
Hong Kong had 26 trade fairs and displays during the period 1955 to 1965.
But from 1966 to 1975, the TDC had organized activities in 159 trade fairs,
exhibitions and store promotions in almost every country in the world which
were important buyers of Hong Kong products. These exhibitions were of
various types depending on the market and products involved. Nevertheless,
they can be classified into three major categories:
a/ Horizontal shows 21 These are of the most general type in which
a wide range of products is exhibited and they are usually directed
at the consumer public.
b/ Vertical Shows These are specialized fairs at which an industry
or a group of related industries exhibit. They are usually trade
oriented. hence direct sales seldom take place. These include
21 This terminology was used in Manual for Export Promotion,
(GATT, 1964).
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certain International Toy, Fashion Fairs and Electronic, Jewellery
Shows etc.
c/ Store Promotions----- They are planned in co-operation with retail
stores aiming at the promotion of direct sales and the populariza-
tion of a special group of products. Sometimes the displays are
devoted entirely to Hong Kong products as 'Hong Kong Week' etc.
The participation of the Nuremberg International Toy Fair in
February, 1968 was the initiative step taken by the TDC to realize its
plan of participating in more international specialized trade fairs
particularly in Western Europe. Since then, Hong Kong has taken part in
more than 60 (from 1968 to 1975 a total of 67 ventures) specialized trade
exhibitions 24 of which were fashion fairs and displays. Toy fairs
amounted to 17 times. The EEC countries, the United States and the United
Kingdom were always the busiest places for these activities. Store promo-
tions undertaken during the period were concentrated in big cities of the
United States and the United Kingdom. Among them, 8 projects were carried
out in co-operation with prominent department stores of the United States
and 4 were undertaken in key cities of Britain.
On the other hand, recognizing the market potenial of Eastern Europe,
a number of pilot projects have been started since the 1970s in Interna-
tional Trade Fairs held there. Hong Kong started her first venture at
international trade fairs held in the Eastern Europe by participating in
the Leipzig International Autumn Fair in East Germany 1971. Later in the
years, Hong. Kong has made her mark at trade fairs held in Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, including those arranged exclusively
for Hong Kong products. From 1971 to 1975 Hong Kong had 31 exhibitions
in trade fairs held in the Eastern European countries 10 of which were in
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East Germany.' All of them were horizontal shows with an aim to
introduce a wide range of products to those countries.
In order to arouse publicity and promote a favourable image of Hong
Kong goods, informative publications in formats of pamphlet, brochure and
booklet were distributed to Hong Kong exhibitions in trade fairs. The
material was usually colourful and written in the appropriate foreign
languages. In addition, photographs and radio broadcasts were also
utilized for this purpose. For instance, a short radio programme in Ger-
man prepared by the Radio Hong Kong was broadcast at the Hong Kong exhibi-
tion in the Vienna International Trade Fair held in May, 1959• Sometimes,
exhibitions were followed up immediately by appropriate trade missions in
order to see that no opportunity of trade was allowed to flash away.
While trade promotional work in overseas has been proceeding
vigorously with productive effect, its counterpart undertaken locally under
the leadership of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association seemed not to be
a successful one. The Association has, for long, used most of its energies
in mounting a campaign with 'Buy Local' as the theme., Under its organiza-
tion, exhibitions23 of Hong Kong were held annualy aiming to arouse local
interest in domestic products. However, the progress that this activity
made was quite disappointing and the Exhibition was finally brought to a
halt after its 31st venture in 1973/74. On the face of it, it seemed to
be the lacking of permanent site that gave rise to the ending of the
22 All figures of Hong Kong's participation in international trade
fairs and exhibitions are compiled from the annual reports of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Industry, and TDC.
23 The Exhibition was started in 1938.
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Exhibition. In fact, it was the lack of real interest on the part of'
manufacturers in participation which was responsible for its failure.
For being afraid of their 'trade secrets' might be revealed to competitors,
many of the participants abstained from showing their best. They would
rather participate in activities which are export-oriented.
The most attractive exhibition held locally for the purpose of export
promotion was the Hong Kong Ready-to-Wear Festival which attracted hundreds
of overseas buyers each year. The Festival, usually held in March, was
initiated in October, 1967 by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries with
funds provided by the TDC. And in March, 1970 it was the first time
sponsored by the TDC who took over the responsibility for the Festival
from the Federation of Hong Kong Industries. This venture was participated
by 108 Hong Kong firms and attended by 798 overseas buyers and local
representatives of overseas buying offices and 26 press overseas representa-
tives. Since then, the Festival was held as an annual affair under the
aegis of the TDC.
By the way, as a mean to create in the mind of visiting business
people an overall image of Hong Kong products during their short stays in
Hong Kong, a 'Display Centre of Hong Kong' was opened in October, 1962 at
the City Hall having exhibits provided by 560 firms. During its five
months of commencement, 5,233 persons paid visit to the Centre and 2,707
enquiries about Hong Kong products were handled, including 1,157 from
overseas visitors. In November 1963, a survey on the value of the Centre
in regarding trade promotion was conducted by sending a questionnaire to
the firms providing samples for display was conducted and the majority of
them confirmed the value of the Centre. In July 1964, an exhibition of
Hong Kong furniture and furnishings which would be later shown at the San
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Francisco Trade Fair was held at the Centre as a means to stimulate local
interest in overseas-trade exhibitions. The Centre was later transferred
as part of the TDC upon its creation.
On the other hand, the Chinese Manufacturers' Association also has
its own display centre established in April, 1964 for the interest of its
member firms. The goods featured in the centre aims to emphasize products
of particular manufacturers.
5.4.j. Trade Missions
Being a glamorous trading centre with locational convenience, Hong
Kong has become the destination for many foreign trade missions. In fact,
many overseas firms and independent agents have set up their buying offices
here for a long time. Meanwhile, in order to expand current markets and
create new ones, trade delegations consisting both of officials and
representatives of the private sector were sent abroad from time to time,
especially after the mid-1960s. From 1960 to 1975, over 60 trade missions
were sent abroad with a coverage of four continents embracing almost every
country which has substantial trade with Hong Kong. Most of them departed
for the developed countries. aiming at the maintenance and expansion of
existing markets. They never forgo any chance of introducing Hong Kong
as a good source of manufactures by distributing trade publications, pro-
duct pamphlets and other relevant publicity material prepared by the
Department of Commerce and Industry, the TDC, and in some cases the Infor-
mation Services Department. These outgoing delegations each carrying its
own specific missions with the promotion of Hong Kong exports as the last
resort might be grouped under three main headings:
a/ Reconnaissance missions to explore new markets for Hong Kong
24 Manual for Export Promotion, (GATT, 1964).
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products abroad. The developing countries are usually their targets.
b/ Special missions---- to encourage the expansion of existent markets.
Developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom
and the EEC countries etc. are often chosen as their destinations*
c/ Study missions-- to view other countries' production facilities
and understand their business practices to find solution for
difficulties experienced by Hong Kong merchants in doing business
with those countries.
As emphasized by its terms reference, it is one of the TDC's functions
to identify Hong Kong as a favourable trading and manufacturing centre,
hence to encourage joint venture between local and foreign manufacturies,
it should provide facilities for visiting trade delegations even their
prime purpose is to sell to Hong Kong. During the period between 1960 and
1970, the Department of Commerce and Industry and TDC had played host to
nearly 100 visiting trade missions though a substantial portion of them
aimed to establish Hong Kong as their markets.
It has been the TDC's desire to break down the 'wait and see' attitude
of many Hong Kong firms and bring them into various markets by organizing
outgoing trade missions. In executing these missions, representatives and
products of participating firms are taken into overseas markets and talk
face to face with potential buyers abroad on their own behalf. The actual
business done during the short duration of the mission may be negligible,
however it is more as a means to induce trade in the future than as an end
to do business on the spot. Furthermore, in presenting their products in
the actual markets, the representatives of Hong Kong firms are able to
see firsthand the competition of goods offered by their rivals in catering
for market requirements, which is valuable to them in deciding their future
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sales and production policies. It is the recognition of these long-term
benefits that the TDC also.plays an educational role in the promotion of
exports by persuading local firms to take part in its overseas missions.
Reckoning from the effects yielded over the years, they have been quite
productive*
5.5 SUMMARY
For an export-led economy to sustain its export growth, it must be
always on the alert of market changes and let go no trade opportunity.
The country must be flexible enough to produce what the market requires,
and make its products known to the market. This falls within the domain
of trade promotion. In this respect, Hong Kong has never lost sight of
its importance. She had started to embark upon trade promotional opera-
tions since the 1950s. This work was-further enhanced by the TDC which
pooled all resources and efforts into one comprehensive programme inclu-
ding the collection and dissemination of information, organization of
trade missions, participation of trade fairs and exhibitions.
Apart from these activities, the TDC should be aware of the adverse
publicity rising from growing protectionism abroad. However, too much
emphasis on export may arouse aversion in foreign countries. Hence, it
should make people abroad familiar with the fact that Hong Kong is in-
terested in trade, not export alone, and she always has faith in free
trade. No matter how, Hong Kong is still a potential market for a con-
siderable range of goods which may be of interest to her trade partners.
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Table 5.1 Number of Hong Kong's Participation in International Trade Fairs, Exhibitions and Displays
(1955- 1975)
Year
1973 1974 19751967 1968 1969 197119621959 19601956 1957 1197 19721963 Total1964 1965 19661959 19611955Countries
1 271 2 111 31 1 3United States 3 5
21Canada 1
204 2 1 11 2 2 12United Kingdom 1 3
1714118442 6111 7811 7E.E.C.- six
(6)(5) (11)(2) (48)(5)(6)(4)(4)(2)(1)(1)(1)West Germany








18528 271614 108 1081 1 2 332 22 2 2TOTAL 7 55
Sources: Compiled from the annual reports of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
and the Trade Development Council.
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Table 5.2 Characteristics of Exhibitions
(1955- 1975)





4 2011United Kingdom 5











Specialized exhibitions included 26 fashions, 17 toys and 30 others which
were chiefly housewares, sports goods, electronics and jewellery etc.
Sources: Compiled from the annual reports of the Department of Commerce
and Industry, and the Trade Development Council.
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Table 5.3 Countries Visited by Hong Kong's Outgoing Trade Mission-
(1960- 1975)
ears
















11 12 16812 7421 1 711 5Total 3
Sources: Compiled from the annual reports of the Department of Commerce and Industry,
and the Trade Development Council.
132
Table 5.4 Number of Trade Enquiries Recorded
(April 1960- March 1976)
L964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
1,6oo 1,700 1,700 20,386 45,629 50,648 50,000 over 53,962 55,644 59,758 69,632
50,000
-. 1966/67 are approximate number of enquiries
trade Bulletin.
Department of Commerce and Industry, and
Jounc il.
Table 5.5 Hong Kong Display Centre*
1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72
5,233 8,131 9,271 8,300 25,080 121,804 133,720 141,863 143,136
2,707 7,601 10,808 10,000 7,229 15,118 14,453 10,570 11,926
1,157 3,753 5,550 5,000 3,621 8,258 8,613 6,156 6,472
s opened in October, 1962.
reports of the Department of Commerce and Industry, and
ade Development Council.
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Chapter 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Being a land-scarce economy with little natural resources, Hong Kong
is highly trade dependent. Since her development as a sea port until
1950, she had served chiefly as an entrepot for South China trade. But
her trade pattern had been greatly influenced by outside forces. The
most important were the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, which caused
Hong Kong to embark on a new course of development by exporting locally-
produced goods. This signified the commencement of Hong Kong's indus-
trialization. 1 But this transformation did not change the outward-looking
nature of Hong Kong's economy, for her industrialization had been led by
export trade the pattern of which was, in turn, shaped by external factors.
Circumscribed by the nature of her economy, Hong Kong has no alter-
native but to employ intensively her gifted human resources to produce
non-resource based light manufactures for export. And in order to per-
petuate export growth, Hong Kong has to maintain her competitive position
and be responsive to changing market conditions. On her path to development
through an export-drive, she had come across a series of events, the most
important ones to her export trade were tariff liberalization and quanti-
tative controls (which ran in opposite directions) in the postwar era.
As far as tariff was concerned, the first impetus was provided by the
Commonwealth Preference which, with a margin of nearly 20%, enabled Hong
Kong to embark on industrialization early in the 1950s. With little
1 In fact, even if her entrepot trade had not been frustrated by
these external factors, Hong Kong would not have. been able to support the
mass exodus from Mainland China by this traditional mode of existence.
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competition and substantial cost differential, Hong Kong's exports were
able to penetrate into the Commonwealth markets and achieved intensive
growth, and seldom encountered resistence in the importing countries
considering her small share in the vast market. Hence, led by textiles,
Hong Kong was able to develop her own manufacturing industries. The
process gathered its momentum in the 1960s when further stimulus was pro-
vided by progressive tariff liberalizations under GATT. Even though many
developing countries were not satisfied with tariff cuts which concentrated
chiefly on manufactures, Hong Kong, as a more advanced developing economy,
was in a good position to reap the benefits from tariff reductions by
rapidly expanding her manufactured exports. The Commonwealth Preference
had been gradually diluted by successive tariff concessions but unfavour-
able effects were outweighted by the advantages derived from the latter.
Thus, in respect of tariffs, there is no problem that Hong Kong had
indeed benefited much from the trend of liberalization. On the other hand,
the GSP schemes accorded by the advanced countries in the recent years may
be a misgiving. For the schemes tend to bias against the more advanced
developing countries, which imply a better chance for the less advanced
ones to develop their export markets of certain manufactures which had in
some time been dominated by Hong Kong. This will result in more severe
competition, and, needless to say, will be unfavourable to Hong Kong as
those less advanced developing countries have even lower labour cost.
At this time, tariff is so low that it no longer constitutes great
obstacle to trade in manufactures. But the reduction of tariff tends to
generate pressure for the erection of nontariff trade barriers as sub-
stitutes for tariff protection. Indeed, importing countries are more and
more apt to resort to quantitative controls. Hence, it is the increasing
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competition and proliferating use of these nont arif f barriers that Hong
Kong has to worry about in viewing her further export expansion.
Nontariff trade barriers vary a lot in their nature. Some of them
are employed occasionally for special targets while some may be used
steadfastly as part of the commercial policy. Nevertheless, they all,
directly or indirectly, distort trade flows. In Hong Kong's concern, the
most important are the quota restrictions on textiles, which, initiated
by Britain in the late 1950s, has developed into a systematic and compre-
hensive scheme under GATT to regulate textile exports. Meanwhile, many
of the nontariff measures tend to bias against the less developed countries.
But being among the few of the more advanced economies in the developing
world, Hong Kong has been better off than most of the others. As far as
her voluntary restraint programme on textiles and clothing is concerned,
her performance had been remarkably well in the 1960s. But later on, as
these arrangements became more rigid and competition getting more intense,
overall performance was not so satisfactory.
Although problems of international trade raised by nontariff trade
barriers have become more pressing in recent years and it has always been
the desire of the developing countries to have these measures eliminated,
international agreements regarding most of them are difficult to reach.
These measures are introduced primarily to meet domestic economic and
social problems in the developed countries. Such agreements are likely
to come across objection as they may limit a government's ability to tackle
domestic problems. In addition, it is not easy to obtain the-assurance of
other governments' parallel action of implementing and enforcing the
agreements when one government agrees to move towards reducing nontariff
barriers.,irthermore, as the effects of nontariff barriers are not
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readily identifiable and many of them cannot be approached in piecemeal
fashion, unlike, tariff, it is difficult to match and balance the con-
cessions made by each country.2
In our. study to assess the effect of quantitative controls on tex-
tiles, we find that they do have significant impact on Hong Kong's tex-
tile exports. Over the past fifteen years, this industry has undergone
continuous deterioration in importance in Hong Kong's export basket. On
the other hand, although clothing has also confronted with similar res-
trictions over the years, the picture is quite different. This is mainly
because through quality improvement and product differentiation, the
clothing industry has been able to adjust itself to the adverse situation,
and it depends relatively more on skilled labour which Hong Kong has no
lack of.
In regarding the trade pattern of Hong Kong, exports still find their
major markets in the advanced countries where tariff liberalization has
taken place and tremendous demand been created by economic expansion in
these countries. Market access to the less developed countries improved
not much due to their protectionist policies and low income. Meanwhile,
the export basket is still dominated by a few categories, nearly half of
which are clothing, then followed by electrical products and textiles.
Other emerging industries like toys, watches and clocks have also developed
rapidly to become important export items in recent years.
It is often claimed that Hong Kong's exports are too concentrated in
market and commodity composition. To some extent this is true. But there
is much room to maneuvre within broad commodity and regional classifications.
z For a brief account on the difficulties in dealing with nontariff
trade barriers, see Nontariff Distortions of Trade, Committee for Economic
Development, (New York, 1969), pp. 12-13.
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For instance, within clothing (SITC 841), there is much internal diversi-
fication and change which Hong Kong's garment industry has experienced
over the years, such as cotton, wool and synthetics. On the other hand,
although Western Europe is usually classified as one single region, there
can be market re-orientation within this group, and the increase in some
may offset the decline in others. Hence, while Hong Kong exports continue
to cater chiefly to the developed countries, there are also some signs of
diversification of markets within this group. Similar pattern can be
found in her commodity composition. As shown in Table 6.1, Hong Kong has
diversified her export basket somewhat into other new products like
electrical goods, toys, watches and clocks.
No matter how, it is still generally true that Hong Kong has still
not been able to diversify her exports both in commodity and geographic
concentrations. This has aroused outcry for improvements on the basis
that such concentrations may lead to export instability. However, past
experience told us that the industrialization of Hong Kong was led by
'export and gravitated by market forces. In other words, Hong Kong produces
what the market needs. This degree of concentration is the end result of
her export drive. Diversification becomes necessary only when existing
markets are unstable. But parallel with concentration, Hong Kong exports
3grew steadily over the last two decades despite of the, recent recession.
I In his study of the relationship between instability of export
earnings and economic structure, Massell stated that the instability of a
country's export .receipts is largely due to the year-to-year shifts in the
demand for. its exports. And if a country is flexible enough to shift
resources among products to market requirements, hence reduce the impact
of sudden changes in demand, export earning will be more stable. Benton
F. Massell, Export Instability and Economic Structure, American Economic
Review, Vol. LX (September 1970), pp. 618-630.
As Hong Kong's exports are almost exclusively non-resource based
manufactures within which a considerable range of adjustments are feasible,
they can respond rapidly to market changes. Thus, not surprisingly, Hong
Kong exports have expanded steadily despite of market and commodity con-
centration.
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Table 6.1 Concentration Ratios of Hong Kong's Domestic Exports, Selected Years 1960-1975
(percentage of total domestic exports)
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Commodity
22.0 19.8 17.5 17.2 13.0 10.9 10.6 10.6 12.6 12.5 9.8
40.1 38.5 40.1 38.0 37.7 36.9 41.6 41.9 39.8 39.6 45.9
4.6 5.6 7.4 8.7 9.9 9.5 9.6 9.6 8.9 8.3 7.3
4.5 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.4 2.6 2.7 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.2
1.9 3.6 4.6 8.9 9.7 11.0 11.7 13.5 14.1 15.0 12.7
71.2 68.2 69.6 72.8 70.3 68.3 73.5 75.6 75.4 75.4 75.7
26.0 26.5 27.7 35.5 41.4 42.0 41.5 40.2 35.0 32.4 32.1
20.4 21.5 21.9 17.2 15.9 12.0 14.2 14.4 14.5 12.1 12.2
3.7 4.6 6.6 7.3 5.9 8.0 8.2 10.0 9.8 10.7 12.5










Federal Republic of Germany
Top three
Sources: Tables 2.4, 2.6 and the trade statistics of Hong Kong.
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One has to admit that Hong Kong's existing major markets are the relatively
stable ones, even though their demand for various products may change for
one reason or another. Hong Kong must continue to rely mainly on these
markets and tap their potentials by trade promotion. The real danger is
the growing protectionism in the developed countries which leads to the
proliferating use of quantitative restrictions on Hong Kong products, and
the rapid development of other less developed countries which will under-
cut Hong Kong's competitiveness.
Therefore, in the longer-run, it is necessary for Hong Kong to produce
and sell those more skill- and capital-intensive products which are not
subject to quantitative restrictions and the less developed countries are
still. unable to compete. In his study on the competitiveness of the
developed countries' manufacturing industries, Helleiner found that only
technology-intensiveness and high degree of product differentiation are
sound panoply to stand against competition from the less developed coun-
tries.4 And we can see no reason why this cannot be a good lesson to Hong
Kong. This also implies that Hong Kong's export promotion activities,
which have been quite successful in the past, must concentrate in this
direction as she moves to a higher stage of economic development.
4 G.K. Helleiner,” Industry Characteristics and the Competitiveness
of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries“, Weltwirtschaftliches
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